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Notes
PERPETUAL WARFARE: PROPOSING A NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
FOR THE WAR POWERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the United States of America has
used its military as a bedrock of American foreign policy, leading some to
claim that the United States remains in a state of perpetual war, which
neither controlling political party—Democratic or Republican—seems
willing to change.1 For instance, former President Obama used past
military actions to defend his diplomatic stance in a diplomatic outreach
to Iran.2 But his sentiments run contrary to post-Cold War sentiments:
namely, war and peace are separate.3
After the Cold War, the United States relied on its military as its
foreign policy cornerstone.4 Its use of military power led to debatable
actions: (1) the Balkans; (2) Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) Libya; and (4) the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”).5 Instead of peace as the
normal condition, the United States continues to rely on its military
regardless of cost.6
See Alex Emmons, Fifteen Years After 9/11, Neverending War, INTERCEPT [hereinafter
Emmons, Neverending War] (Sept. 10, 2016, at 9:10 PM) https://theintercept.com/2016/09/
10/fifteen-years-after-911-neverending-war/ [https://perma.cc/EY3Q-Z6EM] (arguing
that U.S. military engagement in the Middle East seems a perennial component of American
foreign policy).
2
See Glenn Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal, Obama Boasts That He’s Bombed Seven
Countries, INTERCEPT [hereinafter Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal] (Aug. 6, 2015, at 8:15 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/08/06/obama-summarizes-record/
[https://perma.cc/
3SKK-3XJX] (noting that President Obama has defended such a diplomatic stance, turning
to his bellicosity as justification for his toughness in this foreign policy realm).
3
See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 39–40 (1994) [hereinafter KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY]
(writing before 1994 that Americans were “[a] people brought up in the belief that peace is
the normal condition”).
4
See Stephen Walt, The Broken Policy Promises of W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama, FOREIGN
POL’Y [hereinafter Walt, Broken Policy] (Sept. 18, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/
18/broken-foreign-policy-promises-bush-clinton-obama-iraq-syria/
[https://perma.cc/
WUZ9-V5FV] (noting the mistakes of Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama and the
contradictions among their promises, urging less interventionism at home, while pursuing
abroad military interventionist policies).
5
See id. (chronicling the military interventionism contradictions of Clinton, George W.
Bush, and Obama and their failures).
6
See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. Middle East foreign
policy is akin to permanent war); Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal, supra note 2 (noting
1
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In 2016, Captain Nathan Smith filed suit against then-President
Obama.7
Smith alleged that President Obama overstepped his
constitutional bounds.8 But President Obama countered inter alia that
Congress granted him power through the first Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF), providing him with the requisite justification
for military force in Iraq and Syria.9
Smith sought declaratory relief, asking the court to call President
Obama’s actions unconstitutional. 10 Smith’s suit was quixotic.11 Although
President Obama’s reliance on military action to justify diplomatic actions); Walt, Broken
Policy, supra note 4 (highlighting the mistakes of Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama and the
contradiction between their promises for less interventionism at home while pursuing the
presidency contrasted with their interventionist policies involving the use of military force);
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 3 (noting the belief that prior to 1994, peace was viewed
as the normal state of affairs).
7
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, (No. 1:16-cv-00843), 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016)
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution). See also Smith v.
Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (finding that Captain
Smith’s suit is dismissed based on standing and political question).
8
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016)
(claiming President Obama’s use of military force against ISIL and reliance on the first
AUMF violated the War Powers Resolution and seeking declaratory judgment). See also
Smith v. Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (dismissing
Captain Smith’s suit on the grounds of lack of standing and political question).
9
See Barack Obama, Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq, (Sept.
23, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-presidentwar-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq
[https://perma.cc/L92Q-D5DV]
[hereinafter
Obama, Regarding Iraq] (declaring that the two previous AUMFs were sufficient authority
for President Obama to undertake military operations in Iraq against ISIL). See also Exploring
the President’s Draft AUMF, NAT. SECURITY L. BRIEF OF AMER. U. COLLEGE OF LAW, (Mar. 1,
2015),
http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/exploring-the-presidents-draft-aumf/
[https://perma.cc/AL3R-JQC6] [hereinafter Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY] (discussing a draft AUMF dealing with ISIL proposed by President Obama, but
to date never acted upon).
10
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016)
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution based on President
Obama’s orders of military action in Iraq). See also Smith v. Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL
6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (ruling that Captain Smith’s suit is dismissed based on
(1) Captain Smith lacked standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint was not
sufficiently concrete or particularized, and (2) that Captain Smith’s complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question).
11
Compare Jens David Ohlin, The 9/11 AUMF does not cover ISIS, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 11,
2014,
9:26
AM)
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/911-aumf-cover-isis/
[https://perma.cc/599K-38BF] (arguing that the first AUMF is not a blank check and does
not cover operations in Iraq and Syria targeting ISIL), with Rebecca Ingber, The ISIS Lawsuit
and the Perverse Effects of National Security Litigation, LAWFARE (May 13, 2016, 2:12 PM)
https://lawfareblog.com/isis-lawsuit-and-perverse-effects-national-security-litigation
[https://perma.cc/FKS7-H6PS] (arguing that the lawsuit by CPT Smith could perversely
undermine the law and weaken checks on the President due to the nature of declaratory
judgment). See also Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (May
5,
2016,
2:10
PM)
https://lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional
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dismissed for a lack of standing—or, alternatively, a political question—
Smith’s suit provides an opportunity to assess the use of the military, not
only perpetual warfare but also complex policy implications thereof. 12
The War Powers Resolution and the AUMF create a permanency of war;
as a remedy, the Constitution requires a new amendment, limiting the
President’s war powers, by obligating Congress to advise, fund, and
permit the President to use the military while reinserting the judiciary into
war power decision-making.13
Part II of this Note presents a background that explains how the
United States declares war, the current problematic state of using military
force, and the three branches of government.14 Next, Part III of this Note
analyzes the problem, leading to the conclusion that a constitutional
amendment is the solution.15 Finally, Part IV of this Note proposes a
model constitutional amendment.16
[https://perma.cc/UY8T-V2UK] (arguing that President Obama’s actions in Iraq against
ISIL are unconstitutional); Marty Lederman, Why Captain Smith’s suit to enforce the War Powers
Resolution won’t be a big deal, JUST SECURITY (May 9, 2016, at 8:42 AM)
https://www.justsecurity.org/30949/captain-smiths-suit-enforce-war-powers-resolutionbig-deal/ [https://perma.cc/MMV3-NYP8] [hereinafter Lederman, Captain Smith’s Suit]
(describing how CPT Smith’s suit will fail); Jack Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit Challenging
War Against ISIL, LAWFARE (May 4, 2016, at 1:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
analysis-lawsuit-challenging-war-against-isil [https://perma.cc/H84A-J27B] [hereinafter
Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit] (arguing that CPT Smith’s lawsuit will fail due to the political
question doctrine and standing problem); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL
6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that CPT Smith’s suit deserved dismissal
because (1) CPT Smith lacked standing and (2) that CPT Smith’s complaint produced a
political question which is non-justiciable).
12
See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in
the Middle East seems to be a perennial part of American foreign policy); Walt, Broken Policy,
supra note 4 (noting the mistakes of Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama and the
contradiction between presidential pursuit of interventionist policies grounded in the use of
military force while previously promising less interventionist policies). See also Smith v.
Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that CPT
Smith’s suit was dismissed due to lack of standing or alternatively on the political question
doctrine); U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategy Conference Panel I -Is American Foreign Policy
Overly Militarized?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
XvEfjzIQsy4 [https://perma.cc/296L-96DK] [hereinafter U.S. Army War College, 2013
Strategic Conference] (presenting a debate between Dr. Daniel Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier
in which both Professor Drezner and Mr. Frier agree that the U.S. foreign policy is excessively
militarized and relies heavily on the military to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals).
13
This statement is the author’s opinion and thesis statement.
14
See infra Part II (establishing the background, including declarations of war, the current
status of the AUMF, the war powers of the three branches, and the process of a constitutional
amendment).
15
See infra Part III (analyzing the current problems with the AUMF, the pathologies of the
three branches of government with the conclusion that change to the state of perpetual war
will not emerge from the three branches of government).
16
See infra Part IV (providing a model constitutional amendment to the War Powers).
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II. BACKGROUND
The history of the War Powers is how the United States came to its
current position with its use of military force. 17 To begin, Part II.A is the
history of the War Powers from the founding until the modern day, and
the change after WWII from an interbranch decision, vice an interagency
to use military force or declare war.18 Then, Part II.B comprises how the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches contribute to the current
state of affairs.19 Finally, Part II.C surveys the implications and the process
of amending the U.S. Constitution.20
A. Historical Synopsis of the War Powers: How the United States Got Here
Part II.A.1 describes the history of declarations of war. 21 Part II.A.2
presents the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and its aftermath, the War Powers
Resolution.22 Part II.A.3 brings the reader to the modern era after 9/11 to
the present day.23

17
See supra Part II (describing the historical background of how the United States uses its
military and got to the current legal status of today, looking at the three branches of
government and their actions related to the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, and
concluding with an overview of the policy implications and the process to amend the U.S.
Constitution).
18
See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the pre-WWII history of the use of military force). See also
STEPHEN GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (2013) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, LONG
WARS] (coining the term “interbranch” to describe the dialogue between the Legislative and
Executive Branches, which characterized the use of military force and declarations of war
and made the distinction between the previous interbranch deliberation process and the
interagency deliberation as decided within the Executive Branch); infra Part II.A.2 (detailing
the emergence of the War Powers Resolution in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution);
infra Part II.A.3 (presenting the modern era and the AUMFs in the wake of 9/11 and the War
on Terror with the AUMF’s subsequent allowance of military force as an interagency
decision while departing from the historical interbranch experience).
19
See infra Part II.B (sketching the background of the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive
Branches and their relation to the War Powers Resolution and War Powers).
20
See infra Part II.C (discussing the policy implications of the current legal status and
recounting the process of amending the U.S. Constitution).
21
See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the historical basis of the constitutional War Powers and
the acts of Congress to declare war).
22
See infra Part II.A.2 (outlining the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for the Vietnam War and
its aftermath of the War Powers Resolution).
23
See infra Part II.A.3 (outlining the AUMF and the War on Terror).
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Declaring War

Prior to WWII, the United States made formal declarations of war. 24
The Constitution created an interbranch system for its war powers. 25 The
Constitution vested the Executive Branch with the powers of
Commander-in-Chief; however, it also vested the Legislative Branch with
the authority to declare war and to appropriate funds for war. 26 While
some have argued that the phrase “to declare war” does not mean starting
a war, historically, the use of military force remained a Congressional
prerogative.27 Military regulations have served as an example of powersharing between the two Branches. 28
Past Congressional war declarations authorized the President to
conduct war.29 Most declarations of war contained boilerplate language
24
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war). See also
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (opining that the Cold War produced a change
from formal declarations of war).
25
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting to Congress the plenary power to declare war);
id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e. that Congress votes to fund
military operations); id. § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting the division of war powers
in the Constitution).
26
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the sole power to declare war); id.
§ 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate funding for war); id. § 2, cl. 1 (making
the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander
Hamilton) (describing the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief as a supreme
commander but unable to declare war compared with the King of Britain). See also GRIFFIN,
LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting the interbranch division of the war powers in the
Constitution). Thus both branches, per the Constitution, are heavily involved in the use of
military force. Id.
27
See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11, 144–52 (2005) [hereinafter YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11] (arguing that the original
textual meaning of “declare” which allows Congress to declare war should not be taken to
mean that Congress initiates war). But see The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668–75 (1862)
(noting in the dissent that “[b]y the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a
national or foreign war” while also noting the powers of the President for defensive action);
Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, CONG. RES. SERV. (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YMZ-STW9] [hereinafter
Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War] (providing the historical declarations of war by the United
States, all of which are constitutional declarations detailing duration, distinct powers, and
funding and direction to the President, and containing the Declaration of War on Mexico of
1846 which has nine separate sections detailing grants of power to the President for specific
purposes).
28
See generally Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 556–58 (1897) (holding that the
President as Executive controls the military while Congress controls military regulations and
legislates military regulations); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1981) (holding that
Congress has the constitutional power to rule and regulate the military).
29
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (granting the President the authority of Commander-inChief of the armed forces); Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (listing the
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such as: “[the] President is hereby authorized and directed to employ [all
U.S.] naval and military forces . . . and the [country’s] resources . . . to
carry on war . . . to bring the conflict to a successful termination, [and that
Congress pledges] all of the [nation’s] resources.” 30 This system worked
well until WWII, when Congress issued its last declaration of war. 31 The
system then changed, moving from an interbranch decision-making
process to an interagency process subordinating military force within a
foreign policy system under the Executive Branch. 32 Subsequent legal
changes happened, such as the National Security Act of 1947; this Act set
the stage for the use of military force throughout the Cold War.33
2. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the War Powers Resolution
The new interagency decision-making framework existed throughout
the Vietnam War under President Johnson. 34 During the Vietnam War,
historical declarations of war by the United States as voted as joint resolutions by Congress
empowering the President to pursue military and strategic action). The historical
declarations of war by the United States are all constitutional declarations detailing duration
and authority to the President to carry out a war to its termination, such as the Declaration
of War against Germany in 1917 or the Declaration of War against Spain in 1898, both of
which outline the forces to be used by the President and that the President should seek
termination of the war. Id. When the United States declared war on Mexico, Congress’
declaration micromanaged the war effort while other declarations simply denoted the enemy
and empowered the President to reach victory. Id.
30
See Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (providing the boilerplate language
of multiple declarations of war ranging from the Spanish-American War, WWI, and WWII).
31
See id. (providing the historical declarations of war by the United States which are all
constitutional declarations by Congress detailing duration, distinct powers, and funding and
direction to the President); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from
interbranch decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President
to an interagency decision after 1945, leading to problematic conclusions and a dearth of
outright victories compared to prior to 1945).
32
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) (holding
that the President is the constitutional representative of the United States for foreign affairs,
and that his decisions, pursuant to legislative directive, are at the highest trough when
scrutinized); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from interbranch
decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President to an
interagency decision under the Executive Branch after 1945); id. at 63–64 (describing the
incorporation after President Truman of the precedence of Curtiss-Wright as a mainstay of
subsuming the war powers within the Executive’s powers of foreign policy).
33
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 100–02 (outlining the National Security Act
of 1947, which established the structure of the Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Executive Branch). The National Security Act of 1947
reorganized the War Department into the Department of Defense, founded the CIA, and
created the National Security Council under the Executive Branch, setting the stage for the
use of military force under an interagency deliberation system. Id.
34
See id. at 121 (noting that the post-WWII National Security Act of 1947 apparently
endowed the President, as Executive, with control of nuclear and covert action and implied
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Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.35 President Johnson
viewed this resolution as Congress’ concession to his prosecution of the
Vietnam War.36 With the resolution, Congress essentially dealt President
Johnson a blank check to use the military. 37 When Congress repealed the
resolution, President Nixon relied on military appropriations, vice
Congressional authorization.38 In the end, the Vietnam War proved a
failure, and Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, bypassing
President Nixon’s veto power with the War Powers Resolution.39
The War Powers Resolution intended a return to an interbranch
deliberation on deploying the military. 40 The resolution requires the
that the President controlled the use of the military, which was then used by President
Johnson).
35
See Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, Aug. 10, 1964 (enacted
but later repealed, authorizing the President to conduct war in Indochina and pursue the
Vietnam War). See also H.R. MCMASTERS, DERELICTION OF DUTY 126–36 (1997) (noting
President Johnson’s process, via U.S. naval patrols in Vietnam, to convince Congress to pass
the resolution, providing Johnson authority to conduct the Vietnam War).
36
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 122–26 (outlining President Johnson’s views
that his actions and decisions in the Vietnam War were part of his plenary powers and did
not require Congressional permission to pursue the Vietnam War).
37
See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1041–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution and subsequent financial appropriations for the Vietnam War equated to
Congressional approval). A concurring judge in Laird noted the following: “[i]n light of the
adoption by Congress of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the clear evidence of continuing
and distinctly expressed participation by the legislative branch in the prosecution of the war,
I agree that the judgments below must be affirmed.” Id. at 1044. See also REBECCA U. THORPE,
THE AMERICAN WARFARE STATE 133–38 (2014) [hereinafter THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE
STATE] (noting that Congress continued to fund the Vietnam War and that budget gimmicks
and Congressional abdication allowed President Nixon to continue his secret bombing
campaign in Cambodia).
38
See THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37, at 133–38 (explaining how
President Nixon, moving beyond the precedents left to him by President Johnson, continued
a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia, even in the face of Congressional disapproval
when he relied upon Congressional appropriations to the Department of Defense to fund his
use of the military in Cambodia).
39
See Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042 (noting the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution). See also
THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37, at 133–38 (outlining not only the blank
check to President Johnson and then the passage of the War Powers Resolution to retract
such allowances and constrain free-wielding action by the Executive to conduct military
action but also that Congress overrode President Nixon’s veto).
40
See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (containing the War
Powers Resolution of 1973, setting limits which the President must follow for ordering
military force). See also War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973)
(“[i]t is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the Farmers [sic] of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations”).
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President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours after
inserting U.S. Armed Forces into hostile terrain or into areas with
impending hostilities without a declaration of war; furthermore, absent
Congressional authorization, U.S. military forces must withdraw within
sixty days, with a possible extension of thirty days in times of impending
danger during withdraw.41 Thus, the 148th Congress envisioned the War
Powers Resolution as a return to the original constitutional intent of the
Founding Forefathers.42
Commentators have questioned the War Powers Resolution. 43 The
Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
has provided various opinions on the resolution. 44 Presidents also resisted
compliance with the resolution. 45 And even members of Congress have
questioned the resolution, with multiple unsuccessful attempts to repeal
Meanwhile, some Congressional members have suggested
it.46
41
See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (stating that Congress
could approve extensions to the use of military force if done under sudden response of the
President and presenting limitations on the Presidential use of military force absent a
declaration of war).
42
See supra note 40 (outlining the legislative intent of the War Powers Resolution).
43
See, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 353 (2009) [hereinafter YOO, CRISIS AND
COMMAND] (questioning the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution because it
encroaches on the Executive’s authority). See also generally Eugene V. Rostow, Once More
unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (decrying
the War Powers Resolution as a mistaken reaction to the Vietnam War and unable to codify
an essential political question).
44
See infra note 111 (collecting various O.L.C. opinions that enable the President to use
military force based on argued exceptions to the War Powers Resolution). Compare GRIFFIN,
LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 204 (questioning Yoo’s claim that the Executive Branch has
resisted adherence to the War Powers Resolution), with YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra
note 43, at 353 (arguing that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional encroachment
on the Executive’s authority and plenary powers by an act of Congress).
45
See Nolan Walters, War Powers Resolution a Failure, Senators Say in Suggesting Changes,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (May 20, 1998), http://articles.philly.com/1988-05-20/news/
26263790_1_war-powers-resolution-senators-congress [hereinafter Walters, War Powers
Resolution] (reporting on discontent regarding the War Powers Resolution and the failure of
a lawsuit against President Reagan to enforce the resolution); Tim Ahern, Reagan’s Persian
Gulf Policy: A Tragedy Waiting to Happen, EVENING NEWS (June 8, 1988),
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1982&dat=19880608&id=MzpRAAAAIBAJ&sj
id=lzMNAAAAIBAJ&pg=1071,686989&hl=en
[https://perma.cc/H5FN-9UEH]
[hereinafter Ahern, Reagan’s Persian Gulf Policy] (recounting Reagan’s policy of putting
American naval forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran without seeking Congressional
consent).
46
See Pete Kasperowicz, GOP Bill Would Kill War Powers Measure, HILL (Sept. 10, 2013, at
01:16
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/321261-gop-bill-wouldterminate-the-war-powers-resolution
[https://perma.cc/NV9W-TE8W]
[hereinafter
Kasperowicz, GOP Bill] (recounting attempts of Congressional Republicans to repeal the War
Powers Resolution); Brigid Schulte, House Rejects GOP Effort to Repeal War Powers Law FortyFour Republicans Joined Democrats to Defeat the Repeal. Gingrich Said Bosnia Loomed Large,
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modification, requiring the President return to a more consultative
system.47 To date, Congress has not made any modifications. 48 Instead,
the legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is the War Powers Resolution,
providing the legal cornerstone for current uses of military force including
the AUMF.49
3. 9/11 and the AUMFs
Since the War Powers Resolution, the United States has used military
force during the first Iraq War and in Somalia. 50 The newest changes in
using military force are the AUMF, which President George W. Bush

INQUIRER (June 8, 1995), http://articles.philly.com/1995-06-08/news/25690131_1_repealwar-powers-resolution-bosnia-crisis [hereinafter Schulte, Defeat the Repeal] (recounting a
prior attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution).
47
See Walters, War Powers Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on Congressional
misgivings regarding the War Powers Resolution); Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, YOUTUBE (May 14, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFx98M6PI24
[https://perma.cc/ZL5X-3F36]
[hereinafter Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution] (presenting Senator Kaine’s
experiences working in Congress to amend the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG
WARS, supra note 18, at 273 (noting, among other things, that the lack of cooperation between
Congress and the Presidency is and should be a key part of the decision to use military force).
See generally Andre Miksha, Note, Declaring War on the War Powers Resolution, 37 VAL. U. L.
REV. 651 (2002) [hereinafter Miksha, War Powers Resolution] (arguing to repeal the War
Powers Resolution and proposing a constitutional amendment making a war council while
not providing for any cause of action to enforce such an amendment).
48
See Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (offering Senator Kaine’s
proposed amendments the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at
273 (observing that Congress and the President need not cooperate which is a key part of the
deliberations for using military force). See also generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN,
WORSE THAN IT LOOKS] (arguing that the current political system and Congress does not
work, resulting in a paralyzed form of governance which other commentators label a
dysfunctional Congress).
49
See supra Part II.A.2 (presenting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the resulting War
Powers Resolution which stem from the fallout of the Vietnam War and is the current basis
of the legal status for the use of military force).
50
See, e.g., Auth. to Use United States Mil. Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6 (1992),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1992/12/31/op-olc-v016-p000
6_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3QN-CGNW] [hereinafter O.L.C., Somalia] (opining to
President Bill Clinton about presidential discretion to use the military in Somalia). See also
MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’ WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF 205 (1995) (describing Congress’s authorization of military force
against Saddam Hussein with a joint resolution passing by a comfortable margin in the
House and a more narrow margin in the Senate).
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sought in the wake of 9/11.51 Whereas the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was
not understood as a blank check for the Executive Branch, Presidents have
used the AUMFs—in particular, the first one—to justify military force at
their discretion.52 Presidents now seek AUMFs as a Congressional
blessing for military force; for instance, former President Obama
contemplated a new AUMF against ISIL.53 Yet, the first AUMF remains
the mainstay for the justification of the use of military force. 54 Thus, the
AUMFs are the new progeny of the War Powers Resolution. 55
B. Problems of Government and Governance
The War Powers and the War Powers Resolution touches all three
branches of government.56 Part II.B.1 explains the litigation associated

See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 216–22 (noting the problems with the AUMF
and claims by President George W. Bush to wage war based on his Article II powers and not
needing the limits or approval of Congress).
52
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 126–27 (noting that Senate did not intend the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a blank check to President Johnson). See also Jack Goldsmith,
Quick Reactions to Extraordinary Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the AUMF,
LAWFARE (May 16, 2013, at 1:53 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/quick-reactionsextraordinary-senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-aumf?utm_source=twitterfeed&
utm_medium=twitter [https://perma.cc/L92Z-JH26] [hereinafter Goldsmith, Quick
Reactions on Hearing on AUMF] (reporting on a Senate committee hearing and showing that
the military continued to interpret the AUMF as wide-ranging); Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra
note 9 (declaring the two previous AUMFs provided President Obama sufficient legal
authority for military operations against ISIL).
53
See Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMERICAN U., supra note 9 (discussing a draft AUMF for
force against ISIL which Congress has not passed); Jennifer Daskal, & Stephen I. Vladeck,
After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 115, 125 (2014) [hereinafter Daskal & Vladeck, After the
AUMF] (speculating that the Executive Branch would interpret the first AUMF increasingly
wider regarding which groups fall under the first AUMF).
54
See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (reporting his
reaction to an open-ended meaning to the AUMF covering future foes not contemporary of
the first AUMF); Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra note 9 (declaring the President’s legal position
that the two previous AUMFs legally justified military operations against ISIL); Daskal &
Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note 53, at 125 (arguing that the Executive Branch would
more widely interpret which groups are covered by the first AUMF meaning the first AUMF
has an almost unlimited shelf life).
55
See supra Part II.A (showing the history from the founding to the present era for using
military force).
56
See infra Part II.B.1 (presenting the courts and failures to litigate the War Powers
Resolution); infra Part II.B.2 (showing the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch and the
War Powers Resolution and general War Powers).
51
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with the War Powers Resolution and the Judicial Branch.
surveys the other two Branches. 58
1.

467
57

Part II.B.2

Going to Court on the War Powers Resolution

Multiple parties have sought to litigate the War Powers Resolution.59
The War Powers Resolution has proven resistant to litigation. 60 The first
problem is standing discussed in Part II.B.1.a.61 Beyond standing are other
judicial doctrines barring litigation in Part II.B.1.b.62
a.

Standing for Plaintiff to a Lawsuit, whether member of Congress or not

Standing is a fundamental constitutional concept. 63 If plaintiffs lack
standing, courts dismiss the lawsuit. 64 Standing means that plaintiffs can
show particularized injury in their complaint, and does not include
taxpayers.65 Two types of plaintiffs have brought lawsuits over the War
57
See supra Part II.B.1 (presenting the judicial doctrines barring litigation of the War
Powers Resolution).
58
See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the Legislative Branch and its role in the War Powers
Resolution and general War Powers and detailing the Executive Branch and its
encroachment on the War Powers).
59
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–28 (1974)
(granting judgment to defendants because of lack of standing and inability to show actual
injury); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the 2003
invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item, even when the plaintiffs included parents of
soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members); Lowry v. Reagan, 676
F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing an action by Congress members seeking
President Reagan’s report per the War Powers Resolution).
60
See Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016)
(dismissing Captain Smith’s lawsuit). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 271
(noting that significant commenters such as Posner the Younger declare the War Powers
Resolution to be “dead letter law”); infra Part II.B.1.0 (describing the standing doctrine and
lack thereof dismisses further suits); infra Part II.B.1.0 (describing doctrines including
political question doctrine, military deference, and other doctrines inter alia leading the
courts to dismiss suits involving the War Powers Resolution).
61
See infra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the doctrine of standing in the context of the War Powers
Resolution and differences in the standing analysis whether the plaintiff is or is not a member
of Congress).
62
See infra Part II.B.1.b (noting other judicial doctrines dismissing litigation involving the
War Powers Resolution).
63
See Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that a plaintiff must have standing, and standing must be established by showing
actual injury).
64
See id. (holding that a plaintiff requires standing, and standing means actual legal
injury). See also Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21,
2016) (holding that Captain Smith’s lawsuit was dismissed based on lack of standing).
65
See Nat’l Treas. Emps.’ Union, 101 F.3d at 1427–28 (explaining the importance of standing
which is determined by actual legal injury to plaintiff). See also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (holding that an injury must be particular to the plaintiff for there to
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Powers Resolution and military force: (1) members of Congress and (2)
everyone else.66
Members of the military, part of the everyone-elses, can also bring suit
like Captain Smith, whose complaint recited his injuries to show
standing.67 His presumed legal injuries, however, did not grant standing,
and the courts have found other reasons to dismiss on standing for
military members.68 Therefore, standing is the initial constitutional hurdle
that plaintiffs must overcome.69

be standing); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–21 (1974)
(holding that a case litigating the War Powers is dismissed due to standing which must show
actual injury which plaintiffs could not show); Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D.D.C.
1998) (outlining the requirements for standing for a lawsuit in which a citizen sued the U.S.
Senate to change its rules); Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 935 F.2d
1278 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that merely being a taxpayer could not provide the requisite
legal injury to grant standing to plaintiff in his suit). Peitsch also denotes that standing
challenges government action, and “[p]romotes separation of powers . . . preventing
lawsuits [who have] only an academic interest in the outcome of the case [while] ensuring
that a specific controversy is [brought] before the court and that interested advocates litigate
the controversy.” Id.
66
See, e.g., Pietsch, 755 F. Supp. at 66 (finding that the plaintiff could not claim standing
merely by being a taxpayer); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding
the court would dismiss an action brought by Congress members to force President Reagan
to report, per the War Powers resolution, on his military actions in the Persian Gulf in
combating Iran and Iranian forces). The distinction between members of Congress and nonmembers is a clear divide for all the case law regarding standing.
67
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843 (D.D.C. 2016), 2016 WL 2347065, at *2–
*3 (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a legal
injury to Captain Smith because President Obama’s orders violate a soldier’s oath).
68
See id. (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a
legal injury to Captain Smith given that the effects of President Obama’s military orders
violate a soldier’s oath to Constitution and country); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016
WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (“[b]ecause the specific legal injury about which he
complains is not sufficiently concrete or particularized,” i.e. Captain Smith lacked standing).
See also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying the Ash test from Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which provides for the private cause of action within a statute, and
the court ruling that Ange did have standing even as the court dismissed the lawsuit on other
grounds). But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 216–21 (holding that a case is
dismissed due to standing which must show actual injury despite the plaintiffs being
reservist and active-duty soldiers).
69
See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 215–221 (holding that a case is dismissed
due to standing which must show actual injury even when the plaintiffs are soldiers); Doe v.
Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq
under President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when parents of soldiers,
active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members are the plaintiffs); Pietsch, 755 F.
Supp. at 66 (holding that plaintiff’s claims of being a taxpayer did not grant standing); Ange,
752 F. Supp. at 511 (applying the Ash test from Cort v. Ash to interpret a private cause of
action within a statute, and the court ruling that Ange did have standing to challenge the
first Gulf War even as the court dismissed the lawsuit on political question); Lederman,
Captain Smith’s Suit, supra note 11 (describing how Captain Smith’s suit will fail based on
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Member of Congress have also tried to litigate the War Powers
Resolution.70 Similarly, members of Congress must also have standing. 71
Likewise, the courts have dismissed Congressional members’ suits for
lacking standing, even claims of standing based on stewardship of
taxpayer dollars.72 Although often lacking standing and thereby access to
the courts, members of Congress also have access to Congressional fora to
disagree with military action which they should utilize rather than the
courts.73 Moreover, the courts will typically find that Congress cannot
litigate the War Powers Resolution.74
b.

Dismissal Unattached to Standing

Beyond standing, courts have other doctrinal reasons to dismiss any
litigation involving the War Powers Resolution beyond simply standing.75
One doctrine is mootness, and another is political question. 76 The courts
standing); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit, supra note 11 (predicting that Captain Smith’s
lawsuit will fail due to the political question doctrine and standing problem).
70
See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under
President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when plaintiffs included
congressional members); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that President Reagan’s actions
in the Persian Gulf were non-justiciable and that Congress members lacked standing).
71
See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that a lawsuit including members of Congress to
prevent the invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item);
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf).
72
See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress
cannot use the courts under the War Powers Resolution to review Executive actions). See
also Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (dismissing a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under President
George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when including plaintiffs included
congressional members); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that a lawsuit by members of
Congress seeking a report per the War Powers Resolution on President Reagan’s actions in
the Persian Gulf was non-justiciable because Congress members lacked standing).
73
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the
congressional forum to express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by
standing and political question doctrines); Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (dismissing as a nonjusticiable item a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush despite
parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members being the
plaintiffs); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that judicial review of President Reagan’s
actions in the Persian Gulf based on a lawsuit by Congress members was non-justiciable).
See generally Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a
Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy because the
Congressman had a congressional forum to challenge presidential power).
74
See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (dismissing a suit by Congress to review Executive
actions under the War Powers Resolution).
75
See supra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the contours for standing problems leading to dismissal
of lawsuits); infra Part II.B.1.b (presenting other doctrines leading to dismissal of lawsuits
litigating the War Powers Resolution).
76
See, e.g., Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
invasion of Grenada had already occurred, making the issue moot and thereby non-
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also have a favored disposition toward the military and national
security.77 Finally, the Feres Doctrine bars civil suits against the military.78
All of these doctrines lead to dismissal. 79
Mootness means that a controversy is no longer ripe, and a recurring
injury does not counter mootness.80 Even if plaintiffs had standing to
bring a case, military action may move too swiftly for the courts to react.81
In short, sometimes the military action has already achieved its purpose,
removing the impetus for the lawsuit, hence the problem of mootness. 82
Certain controversies are, by their nature, outside of what the courts
will entertain; as Justice Douglass noted “[u]sed to bar from the courts
questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate
Branches to resolve, viz., the so-called political question.”83 The political
question doctrine is a narrow doctrine and relates to the enumerated
powers of the various branches.84 The War Powers are enumerated

justiciable); infra Part II.B.1.b (describing, inter alia the political question doctrine meaning
that certain controversies are issues solved by the political branches, i.e., Legislative and
Executive branches, and are therefore non-justiciable controversies which are beyond court
rulings).
77
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (discussing
the doctrines of state secrets and general deference to the military and military acts). See also
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1953) (presenting the state secrets privilege).
78
See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine
and its bar to civil suits).
79
See supra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the standing doctrine and problems associated
therewith, leading to dismissal of lawsuits). See also infra Part II.B.1.b (outlining other
doctrines which bar lawsuits tied to the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).
80
See generally Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
Congressmen lacked standing in a suit by Congressmen suing President Clinton over the use
of military force in Yugoslavia, but also noting in dicta and concurrence that mootness was
an alternative doctrine which would have dismissed the case); Whitney v. Obama, 845
F.Supp.2d 136 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the controversy was moot even if there was an
alleged recurring violation and that mootness of the suit did assume that the plaintiff had
standing). See also Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (holding that mootness made the lawsuit to
prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already occurred and
continued occupation did not offend the War Powers Resolution).
81
See Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (holding that mootness rendered the lawsuit to prevent the
invasion of Grenada non-justiciable and thus dismissed the case because the invasion had
already occurred and continued occupation did not offend the War Powers Resolution). See
also Whitney, 845 F.Supp.2d at 137–40 (holding that the controversy was moot despite an
alleged recurring violation and whilst mootness of the suit did assume that the plaintiff had
standing).
82
See Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (dismissing the lawsuit on grounds of mootness because
the invasion of Grenada had already occurred).
83
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974).
84
See generally § 3534.1 Political Questions—Political Issues and Separation of Powers,
13C FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3534.1 (3d ed.) (outlining the contours and limits of the
political question doctrine). But see generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?
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powers, and the courts have dismissed various lawsuits based on the
political question doctrine.85 For instance, the court noted the political
question doctrine was an alternative reason to dismiss Captain Smith’s
suit.86 Thus, the political question doctrine is also a bar to litigating the
War Powers and War Powers Resolution.87
One other ground for dismissal is general deference to the military
and national security.88 The state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary
privilege which keeps information related to state secrets or national
security out of the courts for fear of disclosure.89 The states secrets
doctrine also has an example of false invocation, such as United States v.
Reynolds.90 Moreover, in recent years the state’s secrets doctrine has
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
237 (2002) (questioning the political question doctrine).
85
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962) (dismissing a challenge via litigation,
asserting the requirements of standing and doctrine of political question). See also Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the congressional forum to
express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by standing and political
question doctrines when seeking to assert standing as a legislature for challenging
presidential action); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to
prevent George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item, even when plaintiffs
ranged from parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and to congressional
members); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing a challenge to the
President’s Vietnam War policy).
86
See Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016)
(“the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims raise non-justiciable political questions”).
87
See supra Part II.B.1.b (explaining the political question doctrine and its problems for
litigation of the War Powers Resolution).
88
See infra Part II.B.1.b (outlining, inter alia, the state secrets doctrine and its various
flavors as well as the general deference to the military, both of which are doctrinal hurdles
for using the courts to pursue legal action based on the War Powers Resolution).
89
Compare Robert E. Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor
Telman, 63 ALA. L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2011) (replying to an article stating that the states secrets
doctrine, which forbids lawsuits based on secrecy includes the Totten doctrine, which
Professor Telman maintains (and teaches) is a purely contract doctrine dealing with the nonjusticiability of a secret agreement to spy between President Lincoln and his agent with
secrecy as an inferred term), with D.A. Jeremy Telman, On the Conflation of the State Secrets
Privilege and the Totten Doctrine, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2191656 [https://perma.cc/PNH5-D42N] (explaining that the state secrets privilege cannot
be conflated with the Totten Doctrine of contracts which deals solely with inferred terms of
secrecy, forbidding justiciability of the contract apart from any state secrets), and D. A.
Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA.
L. REV. 429 (2011) (explaining problems with the expanded state secrets doctrine and its
morphing from a doctrine centered around evidentiary to a doctrine of dismissal as well as
analyzing the misuse of the Totten Doctrine).
90
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1953) (holding, in a wrongful death
case of an Air Force accident resulting in death of a crewman, that it was reasonably possible
that military secrets were involved and that there existed sufficient showing of privilege to
cut off further demand for production making state secrets an evidentiary privilege). But see
ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, 86 (2008)
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transformed from an evidentiary privilege to a dispositive privilege to
dismiss suits.91 Additionally, the courts have shown a degree of deference
toward the military and military policy underscoring the President’s
authority as Commander-in-Chief.92 One example is the Koramatsu
decision, where the Court found that military necessity was an adequate
reason for the internment of Japanese-Americans.93 Taken together, state
secrets and deference to the military are additional bars to litigation. 94
Finally, specific to military members, is the Feres Doctrine, which
grants civil suit immunity to the military in a wide variety of causes of
action.95 The end result is that the courts dismiss these suits under the
[hereinafter BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER] (recounting, from another source, the subsequent
history of Reynolds, where later declassified documents showed that the claim of disclosure
of national secrets and threat to national security proved to be an outright lie to hide
embarrassment rather than the possibility of secrets being disclosed, in turn showing how
the national security excuse can be used to hide questionable conduct).
91
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–12 (holding that it was reasonably possible that military
secrets were involved in an Air Force accident which sufficed to cut off further demand for
production in discovery). But see BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 86–87
(recapitulating the subsequent declassified history of United States v. Reynolds and showing
that the claim of disclosure of national secrets and threat to national security proved to hide
embarrassment rather than disclosure of secrets); Glenn Greenwald, Court Accepts DOJ’s
‘State Secrets’ Claim to Protect Shadowy Neocons: a New Low, INTERCEPT (Mar. 26, 2015, 9:34
AM) https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/new-low-obama-doj-federal-courts-abusingstate-secrets-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/62PS-ZF6X] [hereinafter Greenwald, Court
Accepts DOJ’s ‘State Secrets’ Claim] (commenting on the dismissal of Restis v. Am. Coalition
Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., 13 CIV. 5032 ER, 2015 WL 1344479 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) and
questioning why, in a private civil litigation tort suit between someone claiming defamation
and a lobbyist group, did the DOJ intervened and had the suit dismissed based on the states
secret doctrine and commenting on the state secrets doctrine’s transformation under the
George W. Bush and Obama Presidencies to a dispositive doctrine).
92
See generally Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (holding the
U.S. Navy, in order to train, could conduct sonar training per an exception granted by the
President); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (remarking on the deference to
government agencies against injunctive relief such as the CIA); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that deference to national security and military met the standard
of strict scrutiny necessitated by a racial classification); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553
(1897) (holding that the President as executive controls the military while Congress controls
military regulations).
93 See 323 U.S. at 215–24 (holding that national security and military necessity met
constitutional strict scrutiny of a racial classification underpinning internment of JapaneseAmericans during WWII).
94
See supra Part II.B.1.b (outlining the complementary doctrines of state secrets and
general deference to the military functioning as bars to litigation of the War Powers or War
Powers Resolution).
95
See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine,
which holds that the military has civil suit immunity from members of the military or their
widows when the injury arises from conditions endemic to military service). See also Smith
v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the Feres Doctrine and barring a
civil suit for sexual assault); The Feres Doctrine and Sexual Assault, 50 TR. 54, 54 (March 2014)
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Feres Doctrine.96 Because Captain Smith’s suit is against the Commanderin-Chief, such a suit could also be barred under the Feres Doctrine,
although the Feres Doctrine has primarily been a torts doctrine.97 Thus,
the Feres Doctrine could act as a bar to litigants. 98 In short, multiple
judicial doctrines exist, such as standing, or mootness, or political
questions, which bar litigation of the War Powers doctrine. 99
2.

Congress and Legislative Turmoil and the Executive Branch and its
Prerogatives

If the War Powers are truly a political question, then part of the blame
is with Congress.100 Congress, as a legislature, is a barometer of the
public’s concern and mores.101 Congress has the power to declare war and
also to amend the War Powers Resolution.102 Congress also has the power
(detailing the Feres Doctrine and its bar to civil suits, especially in the context of sexual
assault).
96
See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57–59 (1985) (holding that the Feres Doctrine
bars a civil suit of wrongful death when one soldier kills another soldier who is off-duty);
Smith, 196 F.3d at 775 (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars civil suits in the context of one
member of the military suing another for sexual assault tort damages); The Feres Doctrine and
Sexual Assault, 50 TR. 54, 54 (March 2014) (detailing the Feres Doctrine as a bar to civil suits
involving tort damages for sexual assault).
97
See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 556-57 (1897) (holding that the President
as executive controls the military as Commander-in-Chief while Congress controls military
regulations via legislation); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863)
(holding that the Commander-in-Chief is a part of the chain-of-command). See also Feres, 340
U.S. at 146 (introducing the Feres Doctrine and U.S. government and military civil suit
immunity).
98
See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (holding that the government has civil suit immunity from
members of the military or their widows when the injury arises from conditions endemic to
military service extending to the military branches).
99
See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining doctrinal bars to litigation of the War Powers Resolution
which can lead to dismissal of the lawsuit).
100
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas
J., dissenting) (speaking on the political question doctrine, which is “[a]lso used to bar from
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question”). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18,
at 273 (viewing as key that the lack of cooperation between Congress and the Presidency in
the decision to use military force).
101
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 330–31 (1989) in holding that acts of the [legislatures] serve as objective evidence for the
attitudes of society). But see generally MIKE LOFGREN, THE PARTY IS OVER: HOW REPUBLICANS
WENT CRAZY, DEMOCRATS BECAME USELESS, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS GOT SHAFTED (2012)
(arguing that the Republican Party has transitioned into a parliamentary party within the
U.S. system which is a reason for the paralysis of government based on partisan politics).
102
See Kasperowicz, GOP Bill, supra note 46 (reporting on attempts of Congressional
Republicans to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Schulte, Defeat the Repeal, supra note 46
(recounting an attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Walters, War Powers Resolution,
supra note 45 (presenting a report of Congressional misgivings in the War Powers
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of the purse, meaning that they could cease funding the military despite
the bitter pill politically. 103 Congress has also not repealed either of the
AUMFs, and Congress’ continued funding for the military is tacit
agreement on the use of military force amidst Congress’ calls for a new
AUMF.104 One possible solution proposed is for Congress to have an
office for litigation, using the courts alongside legislative fora.105 Congress
also suffers from problems of partisanship, which aids Executive Branch
encroachment.106 Moreover, multiple lawsuits have had their impetus
with partisan sentiments.107
Resolution); Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (presenting Senator
Kaine’s failure to amend the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at
273 (mentioning that the lack of cooperation between Congress and the Presidency is a key
component of the decision to use military force). See also Miksha, War Powers Resolution,
supra note 47, at 690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment while repealing the War
Powers Resolution and making a war council while lacking express enforcement).
103
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e. that
Congress votes for funding military operations). Compare YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra
note 27, at 352–53 (arguing that Congress retains the power of the purse, and can fund or not
fund military power, regardless of political cost), with GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at
203–04 (noting Yoo’s argument that the War Powers is not a restraint on the presidency, and
this argument ignores the complex history surrounding the War Powers Resolution); and
KENNETH SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics and International Relations 489–90, in HANDBOOK OF INT’L
REL. (Walter Carlsnaes et al eds., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics] (citing
Mueller as an example to describe the “rally around the flag effect” in which a country’s
leader, e.g., the President, receives increased political support when the country becomes
involved in military conflict).
104
See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 231 (remarking that continued
Congressional funding legitimized prosecution of the Vietnam War); Cody Poplin, 35
Lawmakers Pen Bipartisan Letter Calling for ISIS AUMF, LAWFARE (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:08 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/35-lawmakers-pen-bipartisan-letter-calling-isis-aumf
[https://perma.cc/C7PB-7PTW] [hereinafter Poplin, 35 Lawmakers Pen Bipartisan AUMF]
(noting that lawmakers requested a new AUMF for ISIL); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit,
supra note 11 (remarking that Congress’ continued funding of military operations is a tacit
acknowledgement of Presidential-led military action).
105
See generally Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 968 (2012)
[hereinafter Frost, Congress in Court] (arguing that Congress should more vigorously
challenge, via lawsuit, Executive encroachment).
106
See generally Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress
should more vigorously challenge Executive encroachment by using the courts); MANN &
ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 48 (maintaining that the current constitutional
political system and Congress are paralyzed due to a hyper partisan Republican party).
107
See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that mootness
dismissed the lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp.
333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that members of Congress could not judicially contest
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf). See generally Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d
1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the courts are barred for Congress to review
Executive actions under the War Powers Resolution); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2
(D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that Congress lacked standing and was also barred by the political
question doctrine of challenging a President’s foreign policy decisions because the President
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On the other hand, if the War Powers are truly a political question,
then the other part of the blame lies with the Executive Branch.108 PostWWII, the Executive Branch monopolized deciding to use military force,
moving from an interbranch decision to an interagency decision within
the Executive Branch.109 From this confluence comes the argument that
Congress does not declare war, but rather that the Executive Branch does
so while Congress supports it and pays for it.110 Regardless of political
party, the DOJ’s OLC has authored multiple opinions arguing that the
President can use military force absent Congress’ approval, even when the
situation looks analogous to war.111 This opinion remains bipartisan
determines the national interest); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011)
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy because
the Congressman should have challenged presidential power in Congress).
108
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas
J., dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question” meaning that the lawsuit would also have
failed based on the political question doctrine). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18,
at 273 (noting that a key part of the decision to use military force rests on the lack of
cooperation between Congress and the Presidency).
109
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) (holding
that the President is the constitutional representative of the United States for foreign affairs,
and that his decisions, pursuant to legislative directive are at their highest to withstand
judicial scrutiny); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from
interbranch decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President
to an interagency decision after 1945). See also id. at 63–64 (describing the interagency
approach after the decision of Curtiss-Wright set a legal mainstay of subsuming the war
powers within the Executive’s powers of foreign policy).
110
See YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 144–52 (arguing that the original textual
meaning of “declare” which allows Congress to declare war should not be taken to mean
that Congress initiates war).
111
See generally Authority to use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authoritymilitary-use-in-libya_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/43EA-8NVL] [hereinafter O.L.C., Libya]
(opining to President Barack Obama that using military force in Libya was within the
President’s constitutional authority minus a declaration of war or prior approval from
Congress because of the low scale of the use of military power and the prior uses of military
force for limited objectives such as Bosnia or Kosovo); Effect of a Recent U.N.S.C. Res. on the
Auth. of the President Under Int’l L. To Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 Op. O.L.C. 199 (2002),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2002/11/31/op-olc-v026p0199_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ94-PWKA] [hereinafter O.L.C., Iraq II] (opining to
President George W. Bush about the second AUMF and the UN Security Council’s
resolutions); Auth. of the President Under Dom. & Int’l. L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 Op.
O.L.C. 143 (2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2002/10/
31/op-olc-v026-p0143_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6WM-HR85] [hereinafter O.L.C., Iraq I]
(opining to President George W. Bush about presidential discretion and use of military force
against Iraq); The President’s Con. Auth. to Conduct Mil. Operations Against Terrorists and
Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188 (2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2001/09/31/op-olc-v025-p0188_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S85-
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policy for multiple Presidencies.112 Presidents have treated Congressional
resolutions as an acknowledgement of Presidential decisions rather than
the greenlight for military action.113 But this legal status has not been
viewed as aberrant.114 Moreover, the President, guarding the national
interest, remains the paramount office involved in foreign policy,
upholding the President’s oath, including defense of the country.115 Such
actions have also not led to impeachment of the President. 116 Moreover,
the Presidency remains the major office with the greatest degree of power
B6H5] [hereinafter O.L.C., Terrorists] (opining to President George W. Bush about his
presidential discretion and powers to conduct operations against terrorism); O.L.C., Somalia,
supra note 50 (opining about the presidential discretion to use the military in Somalia in
1992).
112
See also generally Chris Edelson, Breaking the Cycle of Unrestrained Presidential National
Security Power, 32–33, (Aug. 2, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2817544 [https://perma.cc/285Y-VR9Q] [hereinafter Edelson, Breaking the Cycle] (arguing
that there is more that the courts and Congress can do within the framework of the War
Powers Resolution to improve the decision-making process for employing military force).
See generally O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining about the second AUMF and Presidential
Authority); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining about George W. Bush’s presidential
discretion and use of military force against Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining
about George W. Bush’s presidential discretion and powers to conduct operations against
terrorism per the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50 (opining on the use of military
force as within President Bill Clinton’s discretion); Glenn Greenwald, Key Democrats, Led by
Hillary Clinton, Leave No doubt that Endless War is Official U.S. Doctrine, INTERCEPT (Oct. 7,
2014, at 7:56 AM), https://theintercept.com/2014/10/07/key-democrats-led-hillaryclinton-leave-doubt-endless-war-u-s-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/8C5K-UWRQ]
[hereinafter Greenwald, Key Democrats] (arguing that a change in presidents will not change
the U.S. policy of perpetual war).
113
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated
authorizations from Congress as sufficient blessings rather than necessary grants of
permission).
114
See generally Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 112 (arguing that Congress and the
courts can do more within the framework of the War Powers Resolution by applying
tangential case law limiting Executive power).
115
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936)
(articulating the primacy of the President in the realm of foreign policy and defining the
national interest). See also Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684
F.3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers to the President
and their use for detention); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 8 (noting the President’s oath to
preserve, protect, and defend); The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 659–66 (1862) (holding that
Congress’ declaration of war does not preclude the President’s military orders during an
existing state of belligerency); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use
of Military Force, WASHINGTON Q., Spring 2003, at 89, 90–91 (explaining the Caroline Doctrine
and its limited parameters allowing for preemptive self-defense as long as: (1) the threat is
imminent; (2) all alternatives to use of force are exhausted; and (3) the response is
proportional); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, the American National Interest and a
Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the President’s oath endows
the President with certain national security powers to uphold that oath).
116
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240 (decrying the possibility of impeachment
as a remedy for consequences of the President’ use of military force).
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regarding the use of military force.117 In short, the Executive Branch has
nearly monopolized the decision to use the military.118
C. Policy Implications and Constitutional Amendments
Perpetual war has had multiple effects on American foreign and
domestic policy.119 Part II.C.1 presents the policy implications of
perpetual war.120 Part II.C.2 presents the ways of amending the U.S.
Constitution.121

117
See Alex Emmons, Major New Court Ruling Says “Even The President” Can’t Declare
Torture Lawful, INTERCEPT (Oct. 21, 2016, at 1:45 AM), https://theintercept.com/
2016/10/21/major-new-court-ruling-says-even-the-president-cant-declare-torture-lawful/
[https://perma.cc/MW8R-UUPJ] (reporting a court ruling that the President cannot
intervene to protect a company accused of complicity in torture based solely on the
President’s authority); Glenn Greenwald, Democrats, Trump, and the Ongoing, Dangerous
Refusal to Learn the Lesson of Brexit, INTERCEPT (Nov. 9, 2016, at 9:43 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/11/09/democrats-trump-and-the-ongoing-dangerousrefusal-to-learn-the-lesson-of-brexit/
[https://perma.cc/TJ9W-66QD]
[hereinafter
Greenwald, Brexit] (detailing the war powers of the President which President Trump will
take upon his ascension to the Presidency, including the high concentration of powers under
the Executive Branch); Alex Emmons, Commander-In-Chief Donald Trump Will Have Terrifying
Powers. Thanks, Obama., INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2016, at 2:39 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2016/11/11/commander-in-chief-donald-trump-will-have-terrifying-powers-thanksobama/ [https://perma.cc/HRQ7-DLX5] [hereinafter Emmons, Thanks Obama] (detailing
the War Powers of President Trump including the drone program and other military powers
which are currently within the expanded powers of the Executive Branch). See also generally
Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (holding that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is the apex of the military chain-of-command).
118
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated
authorizations not as grants of permission but as blessing to a pre-determined course of
action). See generally O.L.C., Libya, supra note 111 (opining that the use of military force in
Libya was within the President’s constitutional authority without a declaration of war or
prior approval from Congress because the low scale of the use of military power was not
“war”); O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining to President George W. Bush about the second
AUMF and Presidential Authority, the national interest, and presidential discretion); O.L.C.,
Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining on presidential discretion and use of military force against
Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining about George W. Bush’s war powers to
conduct operations against terrorism under the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50
(opining about Bill Clinton’s presidential discretion to use military force); Frost, Congress in
Court, supra note 105, at 949, 968 (arguing that Congress should more vigorously challenge
encroachment by the Executive Branch via the judiciary).
119
See infra Part II.C.1 (noting the domestic and foreign policy implications of perpetual
war).
120
See infra Part II.C.1 (describing the domestic and foreign policy implications of
perpetual war such as economic pressures upon the political system as well as a more
militarized foreign policy).
121
See infra Part II.C.2 (outlining the ways and pitfalls of amending the U.S. Constitution).
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Policy Implications of Perpetual War

Profound policy implications and results of the current legal status for
the use of military force exist, which some have described as enabling
perpetual war.122 Perpetual war has multiple effects, which warp the
policies of the United States.123 One warping effect is the extreme amounts
of money spent on national security, which can exacerbate political
incentives, further incentivizing Presidential use of military force and
Congressional abdication.124 This national security spending is also
deficit-driven, meaning further expenditures actually reduce security. 125
Another warping effect suggested is the overly heavy reliance on military
force as a tool of foreign policy. 126
One further point is that the perpetual war policy tempts further
interventionist military adventurism, a popular policy with foreign policy
elites.127
This policy, which often backfires, perpetuates various
122
See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in
the Middle East appears the cornerstone of American foreign policy).
123
See Glenn Greenwald, The Decade’s Biggest Scam, SALON (Aug. 29, 2011, at 09:30 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2011/08/29/terrorism_39/
[https://perma.cc/W2GW-SN6Q]
[hereinafter Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam] (critiquing the large amount of money spent
on security resulting from the “War on Terror”); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112
(arguing persuasively that a change in holder of the Presidency will not overturn the U.S.
policy of perpetual war).
124
See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (critiquing the amount of spending
based on the “War on Terror” in vain pursuit of security). See generally THORPE, AMERICAN
WARFARE STATE, supra note 37 (arguing that the explosion of military funding has
disproportionately increased pro-war pressures upon congressional districts and states with
less-diversified economies, leading to support and congressional abdication).
125
See BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 10–11 (pointing out the deficit
spending funding the national security state ends up reducing the capabilities of the United
States).
126
See U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategic Conference, supra note 12 (presenting a debate
between Dr. Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier where both parties agree on the excessive
militarization of U.S. foreign policy relies heavily on the military to accomplish U.S. foreign
policy goals). See also William & Mary U., Stephen Walt William and Mary’s IR Institute,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wu0WxTIc1RA [hereinafter
William & Mary U., Stephen Walt] (containing a comment by Professor Walt indicating how
the United States, and the United States alone, has a global military footprint and geographic
combatant commands covering the entire world and leading to the problem of any crisis
anywhere in the world impinges U.S. credibility and its military strength per other
commentators).
127
See Stephen Walt, Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (April 25, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/why-is-america-sobad-at-promoting-democracy-in-other-countries/ [https://perma.cc/LR95-SM9J] (arguing
that interventionism is a popular policy despite America’s abject failure in pursuit of this
policy); Stephen Walt, Why Is America’s Foreign Policy Still Punching Above Its Weight?,
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 6, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/why-is-americasforeign-policy-still-punching-above-its-weight/ [https://perma.cc/B3UA-DQVP] (raising
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pathologies within the U.S. foreign policy community. 128 Such a policy
remains propped up by threat-mongering, even threat-mongering about
terrorism.129 Even a prospective change in the Presidency does not auger
an end of such a policy of perpetual war and its negative effects. 130
Additionally, the policy of interventionism precludes other strategies,
such as off-shore balancing and removing military forces to maintain a

the question of whether the United States’ foreign policy, due to its providential geopolitical
situation, attempts to do too much with the detriment borne mostly by nations in which the
United States practices its interventions); Stephen Walt, Don’t Knock Offshore Balancing Until
You’ve Tried It, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 8, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/dontknock-offshore-balancing-youve-tried-it-obama-middle-east-realism-liberal-hegemony/
[https://perma.cc/PP6H-R6RC] [hereinafter Walt, Offshore Balancing] (arguing that a more
realist foreign policy means re-examining offshore balancing and its differences from the
more liberal interventionist or neo-conservative foreign policy which treats a interventionist
foreign policy as a mark of leadership).
128
See William & Mary U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen Walt,
a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position surrounded by weak countries and
two oceans and America’s great wealth provide enough isolation to insulate America from
the persistent problems stemming from an often incorrect foreign policy elite which lacks
accountability for its numerous failures, proving a dictum misattributed to Otto von Bismark
“there is a special kind of Providence which watches out for fools, drunkards, and the United
States of America”).
129
See Stephen Walt, Monsters of Our Own Imaginings, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/monsters-of-our-own-imaginings-brusselsbombings-islamic-state/ [https://perma.cc/LBP4-NQAK] (arguing that terrorism is an
example of threat inflation and does not pose an existential threat); Stephen Walt, Chill Out,
America, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 29, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/chill-outamerica-fear-terror-threats/ [https://perma.cc/8D2R-L2D7] (noting the problems of threat
inflation); WILLIAM & MARY U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen
Walt, a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position and great wealth provide
enough isolation to insulate America from the persistent problems stemming from an often
incorrect foreign policy elite which engages in threat inflation and fear mongering to make
insignificant threats, such as Iran, into giants which are inflated beyond their actual degree
of threat); Glenn Greenwald, For Terrorist Fearmongers, It’s Always the Scariest Time Ever,
INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015, at 1:25 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/02/fear-mongersalways-scariest-time-ever/ [https://perma.cc/RX9Y-SQX5] (noting the fearmongering
associated with counterterrorism, with multiple instances of political and counterterrorism
figures insisting, over the years, that a terrorist attack was nigh, but which failed to
materialize).
130
See Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing that a change in who is president
will not change U.S. policy of perpetual war). But see Stephen Walt, Why Are We So Sure
Hillary Will Be a Hawk?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/
09/25/why-are-we-so-sure-hillary-will-be-a-hawk-election-trump-syria-iraq-obama/
[https://perma.cc/7PMQ-38WU] (expressing doubt that then-presidential-candidate
Hillary Clinton would be an interventionist President given the major structural problems
facing the United States which would be exacerbated in the event of an international
interventionist agenda attributed (with ample historical reason) to Hillary Clinton).
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balance of power.131 In short, the current legal status of perpetual war
relates to self-augmenting policy and strategic problems.132
2.

Amending the Constitution

Finally, the Constitution could be amended rather than simply
amending the War Powers Resolution; an amendment has been proposed
before, focusing on expanding the people entrusted with the decision to
use military force into a war council.133 The Constitution has proven, over
time, to be extremely difficult to amend, requiring super-majorities within
both houses of Congress and the States. 134 Moreover, the various
amendments to the Constitution have focused primarily on extending
freedoms rather than representing a tinkering in the original workings of
the Constitution.135 One commentator has also questioned whether the
U.S. Constitution and its conceptions of governance actually function well
in the 21st Century, or whether its conceptions are antiquated notions
131
See Walt, Offshore Balancing, supra note 127 (arguing that a more realist foreign policy
means re-examining the policy of off-shore balancing, which places forces outside of a
perceived hotspot, and its differences from the more liberal interventionist or neoconservative foreign policy which treats an interventionist foreign policy as a mark of
leadership); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 140–43 (2001)
(arguing, as a realist, the United States is a regional hegemon and as a realist foreign policy
should focus on strategies of off-shore balancing in order to forestall the emergence of other
regional hegemons which could contest the United States’ status).
132
See supra Part II.C.1 (relating the policy implications of the current legal status of the
use of military force).
133
See Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93 (repealing the War Powers
Resolution and substituting a constitutional amendment making a war council responsible
for deciding to use military force).
134
See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the processes for amending the Constitution). See also
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP
IT, 290–304 (reprint ed. 2011) [hereinafter LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST] (discussing, in the context
of political campaign contribution reform, the process under the Constitution for amending
the Constitution and how the approval of an amendment is unlikely due to the necessity of
super-majorities in both houses of Congress and in the States to secure an amendment and
the unlikelihood of the alternative of proposing an amendment via another Constitutional
Convention per Article V of the Constitution).
135
See, e.g., Vikram Amar, The 20th Century—the Amendments and Populist Century, 47 FED.
LAW. 32 (May 2000) [hereinafter Amar, Amendments and Populist Century] (explaining the
historical developments of constitutional amendments and how the amendments may be
categorized). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2012) (beginning with “it is the purpose of this joint
resolution to fulfill the intent of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations” meaning that Congress
intended to remedy a perceived constitutional pitfall via legislation rather than via a
constitutional amendment).
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from the Enlightenment.136 Thus, while proposed before in a different
fashion, actual effort on a constitutional amendment restructuring the
War Powers has not occurred.137
Another feature of certain constitutional amendments is the phrase
“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”138 The language can mean that Congress has the power, via
appropriate legislation, to enforce an amendment.139 The specific
language varies, but the fact remains that Congress, via legislation, can
enforce amendments.140
III. ANALYSIS
The current legal status, with reliance on AUMFs rather than as
previously on declarations of war, bears close analysis, because that status
is the current one for employing military power and is Part III.A.141
Following that section, Part III.B.1 presents the analysis of a hypothetical
case litigating the War Powers Resolution, showing the pitfalls and why

136
See U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategic Conference, supra note 12 (presenting a debate
between Dr. Daniel Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier in which Professor Drezner posits that the
U.S. Constitution is antiquated, contributing to his main argument that the U.S. foreign
policy is excessively militarized).
137
See supra Part II.C.2 (outlining the process and pitfalls of amending the Constitution).
138
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate
legislation to enforce universal male suffrage); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (allowing Congress the
power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the right of citizens eighteen or older to
vote); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. amend. XIX (allowing Congress
the power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the right of women to vote); id. amend.
XXIII, § 2 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to allow the District
of Columbia to have electors within the Electoral College); id. amend. XXIV, § 2 (allowing
Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to allow the allowance of persons to stand
to be electors regardless of poll taxes). All these Amendments contain the language allowing
Congress to pass legislation enforcing the provisions of the Amendments, albeit that most, if
not all, of these Amendments deal with the rights of voting, and have not been applied to
other areas of the law.
139
See supra note 138 (noting the language of multiple amendments which allow Congress
to pass statutes to enforce the amendments). But see generally Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down portions of the Voting Rights Act which had been upheld
by South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301). See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding that
Congress has the power, via appropriate legislation, to enforce amendments with the
language within limits prescribed in the Constitution).
140
See supra note 138 (noting the multiple constitutional amendments which contain
language allowing for Congress to enforce the amendments via appropriate legislation).
141
See infra Part III.A (explaining that authorizations on the use of military force are the
new legitimate form of Congressional Authorization for the use of military force by the
President).
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such a case is mere hypothetical.142 Part III.B.2 follows analyzing the
Judicial Branch, shifting focus to the other two Branches and their
shortcomings with the War Powers.143 The final section of analysis will
consider the resulting policy implications of the current status in Part
III.C.1 and how an amendment process will serve as a solution in Part
III.C.2.144
A. History and Current Status
Simply put, Congress alone has the power to declare war and fund
military operations.145 While the President remains Commander-in-Chief,
Congress formerly showed a degree of sophistication with its declarations
of war coupled with its power of the purse. 146 Congress has the power to
declare and fund war so that the Executive would not be tempted to make
war, which subsequent generations confirmed.147
Currently, however, Congress does not declare war; instead it created
the AUMFs under the War Powers Resolution to delegate that power to
the President.148 Taken together, Congress seemingly abdicates from
declaring war, instead ceding the use of military force to the President’s
See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the unworkability of litigating the War Powers).
See infra Part III.B.2 (describing the problems with the War Powers in the Legislative
Branch); infra Part III.B.3 (expounding on the problems of the Executive Branch).
144
See infra Part III.C (opining that the current legal status enables disastrous policies that
are costly to the American people and outlining a constitutional amendment).
145
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the plenary power to declare war
via Congressional resolution); id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate
funds for military operations). See also The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668–89 (1862) (noting
in the dissent that Congress alone can declare a national or foreign war while the President
retains powers for defensive action).
146
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (installing the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces); Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (collecting the historical
declarations of war by the United States, all of which are constitutional declarations); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (remarking that the Legislature had the power to
raise armies); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (insisting that the President
cannot declare war because Congress retains that power, but the President retains the power
of Commander-in-Chief).
147
See The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. at 668–89 (noting in the dissent the constitutional
separation of powers whereby Congress alone can declare war). See also THE FEDERALIST NO.
24 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the raising of armies is entrusted to the legislature);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the President, as Executive,
cannot declare war which is a power reserved to Congress, but retains the power of
Commander-in-Chief). See generally David I. Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers:
Protecting Public and Private Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083 (1992) (noting the war powers,
the constitutional separation thereof, and their effect on public and private liberty).
148
See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (setting limits which
the President must follow for ordering military force and providing Congress with
legislative methods to delegate to the President).
142
143
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discretion.149 This discretionary power results in the current AUMFs, the
byproducts of the War Powers Resolution. 150 The AUMFs—especially the
first AUMF—continue to show extreme elasticity, allowing the President
to claim its use against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, despite the fact that the
attacks on September 11th predate the formation of ISIL. 151 Current U.S.
operations against ISIL in Iraq are grounded in this legal mechanism that
legitimates those operations, under the original AUMF; with
contemplations of a new AUMF, Congress essentially vests the President
with the power to effectively declare war.152 Therefore, the decision to use
military force remains predicated on future AUMFs, grants of
Congressional delegation to the President, stemming from the War
Powers Resolution.153

See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 216–22 (noting the problems with the AUMF
not needing the limits or approval of Congress).
150
See Authorization For Use Of Military Force, Pub. L. 107–40, Sept. 18, 2001, 115 Stat. 224
(enacted) (authorizing by Congress that the President avenge 9/11); Authorization For Use
Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Of 2002, Pub. L 107–243, Oct. 16, 2002, 116 Stat.
1498 (enacted) (authorizing the President to invade Iraq). See also Elsea & Weed, Declarations
of War, supra note 27 (providing the text of both AUMFs which note their compliance with
the War Powers Resolution).
151
See Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra note 9 (declaring that the two previous AUMFs
provided President Obama sufficient legal authority for military operations against ISIL);
Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (May 5, 2016, 2:10 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/UY8TV2UK] (arguing that President Obama’s actions in Iraq against ISIL are unconstitutional);
Daskal & Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note 53, at 125 (speculating quite foresightedly that
the Executive Branch would interpret the first AUMF expansively to include threats postdating the AUMF); Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking
on the open-ended interpretation of the AUMF for military actions beyond terrorist forces
associated with 9/11).
152
See Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMER. U., supra note 9 (discussing a heretofore nonenacted draft AUMF dealing with ISIL proposed by President Obama); Poplin, 35 Lawmakers
Pen Bipartisan AUMF, supra note 104 (noting that lawmakers contemplated a new AUMF for
combating ISIL).
153
See, e.g., Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 1298 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (affirming the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers extending to further combatants
beyond September 11, 2001 and their use for detention by the President). See also Goldsmith,
Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (reporting on a Senate committee hearing
with military members who continued to interpret an open-ended meaning to the AUMF for
military actions and inadvertently highlighting that the Congressional discussion focuses on
an AUMF rather than any declaration of war); Daskal & Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note
53, at 125 (speculating on an open-ended interpretation of the first AUMF).
149
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B. Three Branches or Three Stooges: The Courts, Congress, and the President
The U.S. Constitution created three branches of government, and all
three have a role to play in the War Powers.154 Part III.B.1 analyzes the
courts, supposing a hypothetical lawsuit like Captain Smith’s, and
outlines the inevitable failure of such a lawsuit. 155 Parts III.B.2 and III.B.3
look at the Legislative and Executive Branches respectively. 156 In short,
Part III.B will show that a change or fundamental re-alignment will not
emerge from any of the three political branches.157
1.

The Courts

While the War Powers Resolution gives Congress the power to ponder
further AUMFs as a matter of legislative course, bringing suit based on the
Resolution itself is nigh impossible. 158 Supposing a hypothetical lawsuit,
such as Captain Smith’s complaint, there are multiple, insurmountable
hurdles, but the results are all the same: dismissal.159
The first problem is simply of standing which is why Captain Smith’s
Complaint joins other prior lawsuits in dismissal. 160 Even claims that
154
See infra Part III.B (outlining the three branches of government and their interactions
with the War Powers and War Powers Resolution). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1
(establishing Congress); id. art. II, § 1 (establishing the President as the head of the Executive
Branch); id. art. III, § 1 (establishing the U.S. Supreme Court).
155
See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the courts and the inevitable dismissal of lawsuits
litigating the War Powers Resolution).
156
See infra Part III.B.2 (scrutinizing the Legislative Branch and their maladies regarding
the War Powers Resolution and War Powers); infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the Executive
Branch and its maladies with the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).
157
See infra Part III.B (outlining that the three political branches and their maladies with
the War Powers and War Powers Resolution to show that a change in the War Powers will
not emerge from the Branches).
158
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215–28 (1974)
(holding that a case involving military officers was lacked standing). See also Lowry v.
Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that President Reagan’s actions in the
Persian Gulf in 1986 was non-justiciable); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003)
(holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a non-justiciable item, despite
including plaintiffs ranging from parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and
congressional members).
159
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016)
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution due to military actions
against ISIL).
160
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (holding that an injury
must be particular to the plaintiff for there to be standing); Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v.
United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff must have
standing, and standing must be established by showing actual injury). See also Smith v.
Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (dismissing CPT
Smith’s Complaint based on lack of standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint
was not sufficiently concrete or particularized); Lederman, Captain Smith’s Suit, supra note 11
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being a taxpayer and citizen do not provide standing. 161 Even suits by
members of Congress flounder on standing.162 Even Captain Smith’s
recital of his legal injuries based on a soldier’s oath of service does not
grant him sufficient standing, and more modern lawsuits find other
reasons to dismiss on standing for military members. 163 Without standing,
the lawsuit over the Resolution and use of military force ends only in
dismissal, and doctrines limiting the Executive Branch are never applied
to the merits of cases arising from the War Powers; they simply do not
even get out of the gate.164
Likewise, standing also proves the bane of most litigation attempts by
members of Congress.165 Members of Congress can claim to be elected
stewards of taxpayer money, but this contention fails to grant standing. 166
Moreover, by virtue of their position as members of Congress, courts find
that those members have the Congressional fora, House and Senate, to

(describing how CPT Smith’s suit will fail); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit, supra note 11
(arguing that CPT Smith’s lawsuit will fail based on the political question doctrine and
standing problem).
161
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–28 (1974)
(holding that a case is dismissed due to standing which reservists could not demonstrate as
either citizens or taxpayers); Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 935
F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing despite being a taxpayer).
162
See Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the 2003
invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item despite who the plaintiffs were); Lowry v. Reagan,
676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that Congress members could not bring suit over
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf). But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. at 216–28 (holding actual military reservists members lacked standing).
163
See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065, at *2–*3 (D.D.C.
2016), (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a legal
injury to Captain Smith given that the effects of President Obama’s orders violate a soldier’s
oath). See also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying the Ash test from
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), which provides for the private
cause of action within a statute, and the court ruling that Ange did have standing even as
the court dismissed the lawsuit on other grounds); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016
WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (ruling that CPT Smith’s suit is dismissed because
CPT Smith lacked standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint was not
sufficiently concrete or particularized). But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at
216–28 (holding that a case is dismissed due to standing which must show actual injury
despite the plaintiffs being reservist and active-duty soldiers in their suit).
164
But see Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 112, at 32–33 (arguing that there are four
cases reducing presidential plenary power, but not acknowledging how the standing
problem prevents these doctrines being used in the realm of litigating the War Powers
Resolution).
165
See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that members of congress could not litigate the 2003
invasion of Iraq).
166
See id. (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to contest the 2003 invasion
of Iraq in the courts).
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contest executive decisions; therefore, the courts are closed.167 Even one
commentator’s assertion that Congress can and should more energetically
confront the Executive Branch by judicial contest fails to overcome the
courts’ presumption that members of Congress should confine their
efforts solely to their special fora.168 Even when multiple members of
Congress commit or join a lawsuit as plaintiffs, mere numbers fail to
convert quantity into standing.169 Thus, to simply litigate the War Powers,
even members of Congress lack standing.170
Yet suppose the standing requirement were somehow (mythically)
solved; were that to happen, the courts still have other doctrinal ways to
dismiss the suit regardless of the plaintiffs, inter alia doctrines like political
question.171 Consequently, courts will not review certain Executive
167
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the
congressional forum to express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by
standing and political question doctrines); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (DC
Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress cannot use the courts under the War Powers Resolution to
review Executive actions); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011)
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy over
Libya because the Congressman had a congressional forum to challenge presidential power);
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf were
non-justiciable even for Congress members when 100 members joined the suit as plaintiffs).
168
Compare Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (holding that Congress lacked standing and that they
could pass bills to remedy the dismissal of their suit); and Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57
(holding that Congress cannot use the courts to review Executive actions on the use of
military force); and Kucinich, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (holding that a Congressman lacked
standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military force in Libya because the
Congressman had a congressional forum for political questions); and Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at
337 (holding that even 100 members of Congress joined to the suit as plaintiffs did not grant
justiciability), with Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress
should more vigorously challenge encroachment by the executive Branch via lawsuits).
169
See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (noting that even having 100 members of Congress joined
to the suit as plaintiffs did not grant justiciability). See also Walters, War Powers Resolution,
supra note 45 (reporting on the failure of a lawsuit, which was Lowry v. Reagan, against thenPresident Reagan to enforce the War Powers Resolution).
170
See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (holding that the War Powers Resolution could not be
used by Congress in litigation to review Executive actions); Kucinich, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 125
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military
force in Libya); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that even when 100 members of Congress
joined the suit as plaintiffs that they lacked standing for purposes of justiciability).
171
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas
J., dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question”). See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
829–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the congressional forum to express its displeasure
with policy, and that such suits are bared by standing and political question doctrines);
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that Congress lacked standing and
was also barred by the political question doctrine of challenging a President’s foreign policy
decisions because the President determines the national interest, thus dismissing the suit);
§ 3534.1 Political Questions—Political Issues and Separation of Powers, 13C FED. PRAC. &
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policies, meaning that lawsuits cannot change those polices, which
includes any use of military force.172 Should the political question doctrine
fail, the courts can also fall back on either the suit lacking ripeness or being
moot, either of which makes justiciability impossible.173 Mootness can
especially be a problem when the courts work more slowly compared to
the swift use of military force.174 In short, other doctrinal hurdles exist to
bar any potential lawsuit involving the War Powers Resolution,
essentially rendering the resolution dead-letter law.175
The doctrines above are also not the only bars to a lawsuit, but rather
a foretaste of doctrinal hurdles which dismiss a mythical lawsuit. 176
Moreover, the court could rely upon other doctrines, such as state secrets
or basic deference to the military, and the President’s actions under the

PROC. JURIS. § 3534.1 (3d ed.) (outlining the contours and limits of the political question
doctrine, which makes some controversies, typically between the executive and legislative
Branches, non-judicial controversies because they involve a question of public policy, and
are thus political questions determined by the Branches).
172
See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194–201 (2012) (noting
problems associated with the political question doctrine and that political question doctrine
dismisses lawsuits). See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that
Congress lacked standing and was also barred by the political question doctrine of
challenging a President’s foreign policy decisions); Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (holding that
Congress cannot review Executive use of military force under the War Powers Resolution
using the courts). See also Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 229 (Douglas J.,
dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from the
courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches to
resolve, viz., the so-called political question” meaning that the lawsuit would also have failed
based on the political question doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–17 (1962)
(explaining the contours of the political question doctrine); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (disposing of a challenge to the President’s Vietnam War policy based
on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution legitimating Executive policy).
173
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496–501 (1969) (explaining the mootness
doctrine); Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1127–29 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that mootness
made the lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already
occurred and continued occupation did not present a recurring offense which is an exception
to the mootness doctrine); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 510 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that
the controversy was not ripe despite plaintiff having standing).
174
See Powell, 395 U.S. at 496–500 (holding that due to mootness, certain political questions
are outside federal subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and by extension its
subordinate courts); Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1127–29 (holding that mootness rendered the
lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already occurred
making the controversy non-justiciable); Ange, 752 F. Supp. 509 at 510–11 (holding that the
controversy was not ripe).
175
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the bars to litigation, including the Feres Doctrine, State
Secrets Doctrine, in addition to the problems related to standing); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra
note 18, at 271 (remarking that Posner the Younger declared the War Powers Resolution to
be “dead letter law”).
176
See supra note 175 (referencing the multitude of doctrinal bars which all lead to
dismissal of lawsuits litigating the War Power Resolution and the use of military force).
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War Powers, both of which mean that the courts would recoil from
judging a suit on the merits and instead merely dismiss it.177 For a soldier,
such as Captain Smith, to bring suit and to find standing, the courts could
always turn to the Feres Doctrine, cloaking the War Powers in civil
immunity from military members’ suits by making the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, immune from suits from military petitioners.178
All these doctrines, ranging from standing to political question to
mootness to deference to military action to the other doctrines illustrate
the nigh impossibility of pursuing a case against the use of military force
under the War Powers Resolution, inevitably leading to dismissal.179 With
these hurdles in place, lawsuits cannot reference other case law limiting
the Executive Branch, and attempts to litigate the War Powers will fail to

177
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992) (holding that an injury
must be particularized to the plaintiff for there to be standing and remarking on the
deference to military necessity); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–24 (1944)
(explaining deference to national security and military necessity meets strict scrutiny of
racial classifications); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1953) (holding that
military secrets, if involved, should not be discoverable in a civil suit). Compare Robert E.
Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman, 63 ALA. L. REV.
667, 668–70 (2011) (replying to an article stating that the states secrets doctrine, which forbids
lawsuits based on secrecy includes the Totten doctrine, which Professor Telman maintains
(and teaches) is a purely contract doctrine dealing with the non-justiciability of a secret
agreement to spy between President Lincoln and his agent with secrecy as an inferred term),
with D.A. Jeremy Telman, On the Conflation of the State Secrets Privilege and the Totten Doctrine,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191656 [https://perma.cc/PNH5D42N] (explaining that the state secrets privilege cannot be conflated with the Totten
Doctrine of contracts which deals solely with inferred terms of secrecy, forbidding
justiciability of the contract apart from any state secrets); and D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable
Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429, 433-39 (2011)
(explaining problems with the expanded state secrets doctrine and its morphing from a
doctrine centered around evidentiary to a doctrine of dismissal as well as analyzing the
misuse of the Totten Doctrine). But see BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 86
(observing the problems related to United States v. Reynolds, in which subsequent
declassification showed that the claim of disclosure of national secrets and threat to national
security proved unfounded and merely hid embarrassment of a military mishap).
178
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine
barring civil suits from members of the military or their widows when the injury arises from
conditions endemic to military service); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 881–83
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (holding that the Commander-in-Chief is a part of the chain-ofcommand and thus has a position within the military). See also United States v. Shearer, 473
U.S. 52 (1985) (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars a civil suit of wrongful death); Smith v.
United States, 196 F.3d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars a tort
sexual assault civil suit between members of the military); The Feres Doctrine and Sexual
Assault, 50 TR. 54 (March 2014) (detailing the Feres Doctrine and its bar to civil suits,
especially in the context of sexual assault).
179
See supra Part III.B (outlining the problems with pursuing legal action via the courts,
with multiple bars including standing and other judicial doctrines which lead to dismissal
of the lawsuit without any consideration of the merits of the lawsuit).
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reach a consideration of the merits or limiting doctrines on the use of
military force.180 In short, because of the standing question and multiple
bars to litigation, the courts cannot and will not litigate the use of military
force under the War Powers Resolution, rendering the War Powers
Resolution dead-letter law.181 Thus, the case of a mythical lawsuit is just
that, such as pursued by Captain Smith, the courts will simply dismiss,
meaning that the courts are no venue to litigate the War Powers or War
Powers Resolution or provide any correction. 182
2.

Congressional Abdication

If the War Powers are truly a political question, as the courts maintain,
then part of the blame lies with Congress. 183 Part of the problem is that
Congress has only toyed with fixing the War Powers Resolution using its
normal legislative capabilities, or considered outright repeal.184 Other
members of Congress have settled for incremental modification, requiring
the President to consult Congress more frequently and return to a more
consultative system for using military force, but without results.185 Nor
180
Compare supra Part III.B (indicating the problems of litigating the war powers with
various dispositive bars to litigation), with generally Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note
112 (arguing that there are four cases reducing presidential plenary power, but not
acknowledging how the standing problem prevents these doctrines from being used in the
realm of litigating the War Powers Resolution, meaning that the doctrines cannot be used to
argue about the central issue of military force, making Edelson’s paper into an insistence for
the status quo system).
181
See supra Part III.B (analyzing the three branches). See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing a challenge to the President’s Vietnam War policy);
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 271 (noting that the War Powers Resolution is
effectively “dead letter law”).
182
See supra Part III.B.1 (showing the path of a mythical lawsuit and the array of bars to
litigation over the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, leading to the conclusion that
pursuing such a course in the courts is a fool’s errand and leads to dismissal of all suits
involving the War Powers or War Powers Resolution).
183
See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 229 (noting in the dissent that the
political question is a question “[w]hich . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two
coordinate Branches to resolve”). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 273
(observing that the two political branches, Congress and the Presidency, may disagree which
is a key part of the deliberations for using military force).
184
See generally Kasperowicz, GOP Bill, supra note 46 (recounting attempts to repeal the
War Powers Resolution by various members of the GOP); Schulte, Defeat the Repeal, supra
note 46 (recounting an attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Walters, War Powers
Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on concerns regarding the War Powers Resolution and a
failure of a lawsuit against then-President Reagan).
185
See Walters, War Powers Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on discontent regarding the
War Powers Resolution and a failure of a lawsuit to enforce the War Powers act). See also
Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (explaining his experiences while
working in Congress to amend the War Powers Resolution and his proposed changes to form
a military council and the subsequent failure to do so); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18,
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have Congressional-led lawsuits led to anything; moreover, many of these
lawsuits have partisan roots.186
Congress also deserves a degree of blame for the current AUMF status
via continued funding of the use of military force. 187 Funding war is a
Congressional power, one which Congress could potentially withhold
and end some use of military force, even while troops are engaged.188 Yet,
to contend plausibly that Congress would cease funding with deployed
troops in the field, for instance, utterly ignores the political problems of
that choice and ignores the political costs associated with funding, making
sole control of funding an ineffective check on the Executive Branch. 189
Moreover, Congress continues to vote for funding for military operations,
tacitly approving the President’s actions.190 Between continuing to fund

at 273 (observing that the disagreement between the two political branches is a key part of
the deliberations for using military force); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at
690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment which forms a war council composed of
members of the Executive and Legislative Branches while repealing the War Powers
Resolution); MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 48, at Introduction XIX–
XXIV (arguing that the current constitutional political system and Congress, in particular,
cannot work due to paralysis caused by the Republican party and a weakened Democratic
party which has shifted rightward due to Republican pressure).
186
See supra Part III.B.1 (describing problems associated with standing with Congressinitiated lawsuits among other problems such as the political question doctrine which serve
to bar Congress-initiated lawsuits over the War Powers and War Powers Resolution). See
also supra note 106 (noting the partisan nature of the lawsuits with the exception of Kucinch
v. Obama).
187
See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (noting that Congress’
continued funding of military operations acts as a tacit acknowledgement and agreement
with the President’s use of military force). See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that funding from Congress as part of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
includes Congressional recognition of Executive acts).
188
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e., Congress
votes for funding military operations and appropriations for defense); YOO, CRISIS AND
COMMAND, supra note 43, at 144–59 (arguing that Congress retains the power of the purse,
and can fund or not fund military power, regardless of the political choice).
189
Compare YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 159 (arguing that Congress retains
the power of the purse and that a poor political choice does not equal a violation of the
Constitution), with GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 203–04 (questioning Yoo’s
argument that the War Powers are not a restraint on the presidency, and this argument
ignores the complex history surrounding the War Powers Resolution and its adoption). See
also SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics, supra note 103, at 489–90 (remarking on the “rally around the
flag effect” in which a country’s leader receives increased political support when the country
becomes involved in military conflict, making domestic political opposition a fringe stance
as opposed to one tempering the pursuit of military action).
190
See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking that when
Congress continues to fund military operations, this funding acts as a tacit
acknowledgement). See also Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042–44 (holding that funding via the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution meant that Congress recognized and supported Executive acts in
Vietnam).
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wars and lack of legislative initiative on the war powers, Congress has
effectively abdicated its position, and has not adopted a way that would
make the use of military force a more consultative act between Executive
and Legislation, which this Note proposes.191 Therefore, Congress’ supine
stance, partisanship, and other maladies do not auger that Congressional
action will change the policy of perpetual war.192
3.

Executive Overreach in War Powers and Perpetual Undeclared War

The Executive Branch has, in the past, taken advantage of
Congressional abdication.193 While arguments exist that the President, not
Congress, declares war, the Executive Branch has, with essential
Congressional abdication, further increased its control of the War Powers
to a nigh monopoly.194 Moreover, the President’s counsel in the OLC has
argued for even more ways that the President can deploy military force
without explicit Congressional approval, relying on the tacit approval via
funding bills or redefining the use of military force under a certain
threshold as less than war.195 Furthermore, the President enjoys the
benefits of all the dismissed lawsuits challenging the War Powers and War
191
See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (noting that Congress’
continued funding of military operations equals tacit acknowledgement and support of the
President’s military policy). See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 241–42 (arguing
that previously, use of military force was a consultative process conducted by both the
Legislative and Executive Branches); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93
(proposing a constitutional amendment to create a war council as a more consultative model
for employing military force).
192
See supra Part III.B.2 (demonstrating that a moribund Congress will neither repeal nor
amend the War Powers Resolution while continuing to fund the military meaning that
Congress is not an engine to change the current military policy).
193
See Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress, via lawsuits,
should more vigorously challenge Executive Branch encroachment and thereby more
vigorously assert itself in government policy).
194
See YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 144–52 (arguing that the original textual
meaning of “declare” from the Founding period which allows Congress to declare war
should not be construed to mean that Congress has the sole power to initiate war). See also
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated
authorizations from Congress as votes of confidence in pre-decided polices rather than
necessary grants of permission).
195
See generally O.L.C., Libya, supra note 111 (opining to President Barack Obama that the
use of military force did not require a declaration of war or prior approval from Congress
due to the low scale of the use of military power); O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining
about the second AUMF and Presidential Authority, the national interest, and presidential
discretion for the 2003 Invasion of Iraq); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining on presidential
discretion and use of military force for the 2003 invasion of Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note
111 (opining on President George W. Bush’s presidential discretion and powers against
terrorism with the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50 (opining to use the military in
Somalia in 1992 to President Bill Clinton).
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Powers Resolution; because courts dismiss, the President does not have to
alter policy.196
This continuing trend, remaining a mostly bipartisan view of the
Executive Branch and its discretionary powers, also runs counter to a
conjecture that the decision-making process for use of military force is still
a system thought to be working with only a few bad apples. 197 Such a
conjecture also ignores how judicial opinions enshrine the power of the
President to set the national interest and foreign policy powers. 198
Contrary to pre-WWII policy, the President’s use of the first AUMF
expands beyond the inherent defensive powers of the President to make
offensive actions a key foreign policy principle. 199 Moreover, the
196
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the process of litigation of the War Powers and War
Powers Resolution and demonstrating that all suits end in dismissal meaning that none of
the suits, in turn, will affect policy).
197
See Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 129, at 32–33 (arguing that there is more that
the courts and Congress can do within the framework of the War Powers Resolution which
will improve the decision-making process for employing military force); supra note 117
(outlining the expansive powers of the Executive and the President’s broad powers for the
use of military force, including undeclared wars). See generally O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111
(opining to President George W. Bush about the second AUMF and Presidential Authority,
the national interest, and presidential discretion for the 2003 invasion); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra
note 111 (opining about presidential discretion and use of military force against Iraq for
George W. Bush); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining on presidential discretion and
powers to conduct operations against terrorism per the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra
note 50 (opining to President Bill Clinton about the use of the military in Somalia within
presidential discretion); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (opining that changing the
person of the President will not change the U.S. policy of perpetual war).
198
See KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 3, at 39–40 (writing prior to 1994 that Americans
were “[a] people brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition,” and seeing that
the U.S. Senate exercised a large sway in deciding the national interest, via appropriations
for the military, leading to a concentration of policies focused on acquiring territory in
continental North American and foregoing territorial battling in Europe). See generally
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (articulating the primacy
of the President in the realm of foreign policy and the President’s role in defining the national
interest as the constitutional representative of the United States in foreign affairs); Alsabri v.
Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming
the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers and particularly their use for detention by the
President).
199
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936)
(noting that the President is primary in the realm of foreign policy and the President defines
the national interest). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 8 (noting the President’s oath to
preserve, protect, and defend); The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 659–66 (1862) (holding that
the President can still order military force absent Congress’ declaration of war when a state
of belligerency exists and that this belligerency does not require Congressional say-so to exist
to be recognized as requiring the use of military force); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential
Oath, the American National Interest and a Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2004)
(arguing that the President’s oath endows the President with certain national security
powers in order to fulfill that oath); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the
Preemptive Use of Military Force, WASHINGTON Q., Spring 2003, at 89, 90–91 (detailing the
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possibility of impeachment does not exist to check the Executive Branch’s
continued overreach.200 But while the President sits atop the hierarchy of
the three branches of the United States government to determine the
national interest within its foreign policy powers, reducing the use of
American military force from an interbranch deliberation to an
interagency deliberation within the Executive Branch has not led to better
policy, systematic recalibration, or unmitigated success in war; that policy,
instead, is the result of the current state of affairs with the War Powers
Resolution.201 Even a change in the Presidency seems unlikely to change
In short, given the benefits of
the current policy situation.202
Congressional abdication, bars of litigation, and discretion to use military
force, the President is extremely unlikely to change a system which
benefits the Executive.203 Thus, change to the perpetual war policy is
unlikely to emerge from the Judiciary, the Legislature, or the Executive. 204
C. Effects of the Problem and Changing the Situation
As with any legal status, inquiries about the results of the AUMFs and
their effect on the United States are important questions, to which the
Caroline Doctrine and its limited parameters allowing for preemptive self-defense); WILLIAM
& MARY U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen Walt, a realist, who
describes the use of military force as a magic button which the President can use to make
problems in non-strategic areas go away for a paltry millions of dollars).
200
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240 (noting that impeachment is a poor
possibility to call a President to heel on overreach).
201
See id. at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions to employ military force,
changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to a deliberation within the
Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to questionable military results).
See also infra Part III (analyzing the problematic policy results of the current status of AUMF
and the War Powers Resolution).
202
See Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing that a change in presidents will
not change that the United States continues perpetual war); Greenwald, Brexit, supra note
117 (arguing that the change in Presidents from Obama to Trump has placed President
Trump in charge of a perpetual war machine which was discounted by some commentators
because of President Obama’s charisma and apparent even-handedness); Emmons, Thanks
Obama, supra note 117 (noting the policy of perpetual war and the arsenal of nuclear
weapons, drone program, et al which President Trump now controls under the Executive
Branch).
203
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the litigation of the War Powers and War Powers
Resolution, leading to the conclusion that courts dismiss all suits involving those subjects);
supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing Congress’ inaction to either repeal or amend the War Powers
Resolution while continuing to fund the military, leading to a conclusion that Congress is
paralyzed); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the Executive Branch and demonstrating that the
Executive Branch, with its discretion over military force via the AUMF, is the clear driver of
this policy unfettered by the other two Branches).
204
See supra Part III.B (arguing that neither the courts, based on bars to litigation, nor
Congress, based on its paralysis, nor the Executive, based on received benefits, will end or
modify the policy of perpetual war).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 2

494

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

answers are not positive.205 The current state of affairs encourages further
Executive Branch encroachment, with the abdication if not
encouragement of Congressional members whose districts are so
dependent on spending associated with the AUMF and perpetual war. 206
Such spending incentivizes and reinforces the current system, from which
America’s geopolitical position insulates it from more of the baneful
effects.207 Instead of a time when peace and war were entirely distinct
phases, a self-reinforcing, permanent state of war predicated on a
pernicious focus on interventionism is in place. 208
Given the resultant problems of the current status, many have thought
to change it.209 But neither the courts nor Congress are viable avenues to
change the current status of the War Powers Resolution and AUMFs’

205
See WGBH Forum, Washington Rules: The Path to Permanent War, YOUTUBE (March 31,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc2TJ76dcYs
[hereinafter Bacevich,
Washington Rules] (presenting Professor Andrew Bacevich who argues that military
engagement has become the de facto response of American foreign policy, and that the
Department of Defense is an instrument of oversees power projection, vice homeland
defense).
206
See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (critiquing the large amount of
money appropriated to the “War on Terror” in the pursuit of security with dubious results).
See generally THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37 (arguing that the explosion
of military funding has disproportionately increased pro-war pressures upon congressional
districts and states with less diversified economies, leading to support and congressional
abdication).
207
See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (questioning the large amount of
money spent in pursuit of security in the “War on Terror” resulting in questionable results
and questionable domestic effects); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing
persuasively that a change in presidents will not change that the United States continues
perpetual war). See also William & Mary U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting
Professor Stephen Walt, a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position,
surrounded by weak countries and two oceans, and America’s great wealth provide enough
isolation to insulate America from the persistent foreign policy problems stemming from an
often incorrect foreign policy elite lacking accountability for its numerous failures, as
evidenced by a dictum misattributed to Otto von Bismark “there is a special kind of
Providence which watches out for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America”).
208
Compare Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing persuasively that a change
in presidents will not change that the United States continues perpetual war), and Bacevich,
Washington Rules, supra note 205 (presenting Professor Andrew Bacevich who argues that
military engagement has become America’s de facto foreign policy), and Emmons,
Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in the Middle East is
essentially a permanent foundation of American foreign policy), with KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY,
supra note 3, at 39–40 (writing at the end of the Cold War that Americans were “[a] people
brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition” and denoting that war and peace
were previously viewed as distinct and separate conditions).
209
See supra Part II.C (presenting the results of the current legal status for the use of military
power); supra Part III.B.2 (noting Congress’ failures to change the War Powers Resolution
amid flirtations with repealing it wholesale).
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current status.210 Nor is the Executive Branch likely to self-regulate.211
Given these problems, the solution appears: an amendment to the
Constitution, an admittedly tough proposition. 212 An amendment is an
extremely difficult proposal, requiring a super-majority in Congress and
the States, or alternatively, a new Constitutional Convention which has
never happened.213 Such an amendment would work above and
alongside the War Powers Resolution, and focus on four major items: (1)
allowing the courts to be used to litigate the use of military force in a
manner which is foreseeable and scalable, limiting the power to bring a
lawsuit solely to the President and Congress; (2) requiring Congress and
the President to deliberate in an interbranch manner regarding the use of
military force; (3) requiring Congress to avoid tacit approval by having
periodic, public votes reaffirming the use of military force and paying for
it; and (4) providing ways for Congress or the President, via the courts, to
enforce the amendment.214 In short, rather than an amendment
210
See supra Part III.B (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers
Resolution, the failures of Congress to change the War Powers Resolution or to attempt any
other actions beyond abdication, and the Executive Branch’s exploitation of the situation).
211
See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions
to employ military force, changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to
a deliberation within the Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to
questionable military results and noting that the Executive Branch is unlikely to self-correct
as opposed to being balanced by the other Branches). See also supra Part III (reviewing the
Executive Branch and its nigh monopolization of interagency decision-making for using
military force and arguing that the President is unlikely to change the current status quo).
212
See Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (indicating that a most serious
approach is the proposal of a constitutional amendment to solve a problem). See also LESSIG,
REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at 290–304 (providing an overview of the process under the
Constitution for amending the Constitution and the difficulties of having super-majorities in
both houses of Congress and in the States to secure an amendment, meaning that a proposed
amendment will be extremely unlikely despite the other alternative of another Constitutional
Convention provided in Article V of the Constitution); Amar, Amendments and Populist
Century, supra note 135 (explaining the historical developments of constitutional
amendments and how the amendments may be categorized as well as noting the few
numbers of amendments).
213
See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the processes for amending the Constitution in which
amendments can emerge from either two-thirds of the States or from Congress); Miksha, War
Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (noting that proposing a constitutional amendment is
the most serious approach to solving the question of the War Powers). See also LESSIG,
REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at 290–304 (providing an overview of the process to amend
the Constitution and the difficulties of having super majorities in both houses of Congress
and in the States to secure an amendment, meaning that a proposed amendment will be
extremely unlikely despite the other alternative of another Constitutional Convention
provided in Article V of the Constitution which requires a super majority of the states).
214
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers
Resolution). See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that
funding for the Vietnam War attached to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution meant Congressional
recognition and support for President Johnson’s Vietnam War); supra Part III.B.2 (noting
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reaffirming rights or expanding the popular nature of society, this
amendment must re-entangle the Legislative and Executive Branches
when approaching the important task of using military force. 215
When appraising the War Powers and checks on their modern use
compared to former declarations of war, one comes to the conclusion that
the courts do not work, Congress functions even less, and only the
Executive Branch decides on the use of military force while Congress
pays.216 The existing legal status supports the current interventionist
policy at the Executive Branch’s behest, despite the resultant problems. 217
Given the problems and the non-functional solutions, the answer is clear:
in the light of failure of checks and balances, a new constitutional
amendment is required to remedy the dysfunction and produce better
policy outcomes for the United States.218
Congress’ failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations with repealing it
wholesale); Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (asserting that
continued funding of military operations is a tacit acknowledgement); supra Part III.B.3
(noting continued executive encroachment on issues of war powers and the use of military
force); supra Part II.C.2 (noting the path of amendments and that certain amendments have
sections and clauses allowing for Congressional enforcement via appropriate legislation).
215
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing past court cases and arguing that the courts cannot be
used to litigate the War Powers Resolution). See also supra Part III.B.2 (noting Congressional
failures to change the War Powers Resolution and act as a check on Executive overreach);
Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking that continued
funding of military operations equals tacit acknowledgement); supra Part III.B.3 (noting
continued executive encroachment on issues of war powers and the use of military force);
supra Part III.C (outlining the resultant policy effects based on the current legal status);
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions to employ
military force, changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to a
deliberation within the Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to
questionable military results in the interagency use of military force under the Executive
Branch).
216
See supra Part III.A (outlining the problems of the War Powers Resolution). See also
supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers
Resolution, noting Congress’s failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations
with repealing it wholesale, and noting continued executive encroachment on issues of War
Powers and the use of military force).
217
See supra Part III.C (discussing the resultant policy effects based on the current legal
status, which enables further interventionism based on the use of military force as well as
the process of analyzing the path to amending the Constitution).
218
See supra Part III.A (outlining the current problems associated the War Powers
Resolution including the current AUMFs). See also supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures
of using the courts to litigate the War Powers Resolution); supra Part III.B.2 (noting
Congress’s failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations with repealing it
wholesale); supra Part III.B.3 (noting continued Executive encroachment on issues of War
Powers and the use of military force); supra Part III.C (discussing the resultant policy effects
based on the current legal status, which enables further interventionism based on the use of
military force and arguing in the absence of workable solutions, the ultimate solution, a
constitutional amendment, is the only working answer to the problem of the War Powers).
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
The first section presents the proposed constitutional amendment.219
The second section, concluding this Note’s contribution, is a commentary
of the proposed amendment.220
A. Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Thus the amendment should read as follows:
§ 1 The sustained use of military force must be a decision of the
Congress and the President. Both branches, in total, must meet
and discuss the use of military force beyond thirty days. The
President, while Commander-in-Chief, cannot employ offensive
military force or declare war on the President’s own
recognizance.
§ 2 Congressional representatives, either representative or
senator, shall have standing to litigate this measure if duly
authorized as a delegation from Congress based on joint
resolution. This measure will be decided on the merits of the
case presented by Congress before dismissal.
§ 3 Congress must periodically reaffirm the use of military force
and vote the levies to pay for the use of military force. These
periodic reaffirmations must be public, open, joint, and
recorded. The President may have recourse to the courts to
enforce this provision.
§ 4 Presidential failure to abide under this article is grounds for
impeachment, and follows the normal procedure in the
Constitution.
§ 5 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. 221

219
See infra Part IV.A (putting forth a constitutional amendment making Congress
responsible for declarations of war and for periodic renewals to continue the use of military
force while requiring the President to plan the use of military force and linking both Branches
in an arrangement allowing either Branch to turn to the Courts to enforce the duties of each
Branch in order to provide an enforcement mechanism within the amendment).
220
See infra Part IV.B (addressing concerns with the constitutional amendment with the
intent of trying to restore an interbranch deliberation model for the use of military force
based on a judicial pathway to force the Executive and Legislative Branches to act in concert
when deliberating the use of military force).
221
This amendment is the author’s contribution, embodying the intent of recreating an
interbranch system and creating a judicial pathway for either Congress or the President to
enforce the terms of this amendment and pre-supposing the repeal of the first AUMF. See
supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problem of Congressional abdication); supra Part III
(analyzing the effects and resulting policy of the current status of the use of military force
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B. Commentary
A proposed constitutional amendment improving the constitutional
War Powers must contain several parts, which solve the problems
A constitutional
associated with the War Powers Resolution.222
amendment is a major step, because proposing a constitutional
amendment is also an admission that a simple legislative fix for the War
Powers does not exist, and the current situation will not change from
efforts emerging from the three Branches. 223 Attempts to amend the War
Powers Resolution, attempts at outright repeal, and actions of the
Executive Branch, regardless of political party, to circumvent the War
Powers Resolution all support a conclusion that a simple legislative fix
does not exist.224 Moreover, constitutional amendments are rare and
extremely difficult requiring super-majorities, but because a legislative fix
is not possible, an amendment appears an even more unlikely option, but
is the solution when all three branches are the problem.225
The first portion of the proposed amendment is that it must restate
with vigor that the decision to use military force is not a decision solely
and process of amending the Constitution); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the problems related
to the use of military force related to the President and the problems of Executive overreach
by the President in order to use military force, in effect obviating the power of declaring war
vested with Congress); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the bars to litigation and the probable
dismissal of any lawsuit litigating the War Powers Resolution or the use of military force).
See also supra note 138 (noting the language and existence of provisions within constitutional
amendments allowing Congress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce an amendment,
meaning that the language could also allow for the use of the War Powers Resolution or
amendments thereto as enforcing legislation).
222
See supra note 218 (analyzing the legal status and problems related to the War Powers
Resolution and the constitutional War Powers).
223
See supra Part III (describing that the use of military force, previously an interbranch
decision, has become something that cannot be fixed solely by the Judicial Branch because of
the various bars to litigation, cannot be fixed by the legislature due to partisan rancor and
Congressional abdication, and cannot be fixed by sole action of the Executive Branch which
has monopolized the use of military force as an interagency decision).
224
See supra note 124 (noting the funding from the government related to the “War on
Terror” and its effects both on private markets and security-related companies as well as a
detrimental effect on politics and enabling of certain policies via incentivizing Congressional
inaction or abdication).
225
See U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing how to amend the Constitution by either an
amendment emerging from Congress or via a new Constitutional Convention called by twothirds of the States); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (noting that
proposing a constitutional amendment is the most serious approach to solving a problem).
See also LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at 290–304 (presenting an overview of
amending the Constitution requiring super-majorities in both houses of Congress and in the
States to secure an amendment, or the other alternative of another Constitutional Convention
provided in Article V of the Constitution which requires a super majority of the states, both
of which are extremely difficult hurdles to overcome in order to amend the Constitution).
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endowed to the President.226 Traditionally, the decision to use military
force has been a bilateral decision involving both the Executive and
Legislative Branches.227 This recognition means that a section of the
amendment must cement that the normal process for deciding the use of
military force must be a consultative decision involving Congress and not
left solely to the decisions or whims of the President, in effect following
the purpose of the War Powers Resolution.228
In reincorporating Congress into the decision to use military force, the
amendment should have clear language describing how Congress
periodically assesses the decision and passes a budget for using military
force.229 Congress is a barometer of the public feeling, and an amendment
would reassert that Congress has to act as a proxy on behalf of the
public.230 Therefore, an amendment would reinforce that Congress must
periodically reaffirm, for the duration of the use of military force, that
Congress supports this use of military force. 231 Thus, Congress would
actually act upon its power of the purse to affirm and spend for the use of

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (making Congress the branch with the power to declare
war); id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress control of funding for military operations); U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces). See also
supra Part III.A (denoting that the history of the use of military force has focused on the use
of war decided by both the Executive and Legislative Branches); supra Part II.A (outlining
the history of the United States from the founding to the present day and outlining the
previous practice of interbranch deliberations for the use of military force).
227
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the interbranch decision to use military force); supra Part
II.A (outlining the history of the United States from the founding to the present day and
highlighting the interbranch practice of deliberating the use of military force from the
founding until WWII).
228
See supra note 214 (analyzing the failures of all three branches of government on the
War Powers Resolution and the constitutional War Powers). See also supra note 40 (noting
the purpose of the War Powers Resolution to restore the use of the War Powers as envisioned
by the constitutional Founders).
229
See supra Part III (noting the problems of Congress and its abdication, including that
Congress can tacitly approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department
of Defense); supra note 187 (noting that the Congress continues to pass the budgets funding
the use of military force, denoting tacit support for the use of military force).
230
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 330–31 (1989)) (relating that state legislatures, and Congress as the head of the
Legislative Branch, act theoretically as barometers of social mores and opinion).
231
Cf. note 187 (indicating the degree of passivity upon which Congress can rely, tacitly
approving military force via voting for budgets without actually and explicitly defending
the use of military force).
226
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military force.232 Moreover, Congress should also insist on how the
money for military force has been spent. 233
One apparent problem in crafting a combination of a choke-chain and
the Sword of Damocles is that it promotes encroachment between both the
While some
Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. 234
commentators, such as John Yoo, uphold a view of the Executive Branch
as leading and deciding war, this amendment would give effect to the
intent of the War Powers Resolution, which was to restore the decision of
the use of the military force as an interbranch decision. 235 Moreover,
making the delegation to represent Congress in a lawsuit would also
damper pure partisanship, which has tainted other litigation involving the
War Powers.236
Another problem which an amendment must solve is the lack of
justiciability of the War Powers Resolution. 237 As noted, the War Powers
Resolution has proven to be the equivalent of dead-letter law, with
various doctrines deployed by the courts to avoid deciding on the
question of War Powers.238 In solving this question, the answer cannot be
to allow just anyone to sue over war policy; instead, the standing should
be restricted to a delegation from Congress, but within reason so as not to

232
See supra note 218 (outlining the sections of the Analysis section indicating that neither
the courts nor the other branches of government are the potential drivers for changing the
current legal status of the War Powers and the underlying policy implications of that legal
status); supra Part III.B.2 (outlining the problems related to Congress).
233
Cf. Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (demonstrating the previous
declarations of war which were public declarations by the Congress and nation).
234
See supra Part III.B.3 (presenting an argument of Executive Branch overreach and
problems resulting from interagency decisions regarding the use of military force). See also
supra note 40 (reporting the War Powers Resolution purpose to “[t]o fulfill the intent of the
Farmers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of
both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities”).
235
See supra Part III.B.3 (presenting an argument of Executive Branch overreach and
problems associated with solely interagency decisions regarding the use of military force).
See also supra note 40 (reporting the purpose of the War Powers Resolution to “[i]t is the
purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the Farmers of the Constitution of the
United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities”).
236
See supra Part III.B.1 (noting the problems associated with the standing problem with
suits by Congress).
237
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the various bars to litigation over the constitutional War
Powers and the War Powers Resolution leading courts to dismiss all lawsuits which seek to
litigate the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).
238
See supra Part III.B.1 (referencing the analysis section and the problems of litigating the
War Powers Resolution). See also supra note 60 (noting that the War Powers Resolution is
dead-letter law).
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invite partisan rancor to overwhelm sober thought. 239 Likewise, the
President should also have standing to sue regarding the budgetary
elements related to budgeting for military force. 240
Moreover, solving the justiciability issue addresses another
problem.241 Constitutional amendments do not have elements that
automatically enforce them; for instance, the Fourteenth Amendment
states that Congress shall pass laws enabling the object of the
amendment.242 The inclusion of the judiciary into the issue of military
force provides an enforcement mechanism for the provisions of the
proposed constitutional amendment, and prevents the amendment from
being dead-letter law, a flaw with another proposed amendment. 243
One other possibility is to include failure of the President to follow the
amendment’s parameters as a cause for impeachment. 244 While a major
decision fraught with the possibility of government paralysis, such a
decision would also add another edge to the amendment, because
Congress would have a cause for action independent of the courts and the

239
Cf. note 106 (noting that the Executive Branch takes advantage of dithering and
abdication by Congress in the realm of war powers).
240
Cf. note 239 (noting the problems of Congress, including that Congress can tacitly
approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department of Defense). See also
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (remarking on continued
Congressional funding as legitimizing Executive action and prosecution of the Vietnam
War); supra note 188 (noting that the Congress continues to pass the budgets funding the use
of military force, denoting tacit support for the use of military force).
241
See supra Part III.C (referencing the analysis section dealing with the problem of
litigating the War Powers Resolution and the problem of pursuing action via the courts and
that courts dismiss all lawsuits litigating the War Powers and War Powers Resolution). See
also Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (containing the previous declarations of
war which were public declarations by the Congress).
242
See supra Part III.C (analyzing the problems related to amending the Constitution). See
also supra Part II.C.2 (presenting the background of amending the Constitution and the
difficulty of such a feat because it requires a super-majority in both Congress and the
individual states).
243
See supra Part III (analyzing the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, leading to a
conclusion that neither the courts nor the other branches of government are the drivers for
changing the current legal status of the War Powers and the underlying policy implications
of that legal status, and remarking specifically on the problems related to Congress,
including partisanship and Congressional abdication). See also Miksha, War Powers
Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment to create a war
council as a more consultative model for employing military force, but which lacked any
enforcement language, relying on dicta from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803)
reading, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without
effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it”).
244
See supra Part III.B.3 (indicating the overreach of the Executive Branch and how the first
AUMF enables the use of offensive military force beyond self-defense to be part of U.S.
foreign policy). But see supra note 200 (decrying the possibility of impeachment).
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standing controversy associated with cases involving the War Powers. 245
Including a cause for impeachment would also serve as a way to modify
presidential behavior, especially behavior associated with the various
presidential dodges used to circumvent the reporting and consulting
requirements of the War Powers Resolution.246 On the downside, this
provision is also open to partisan abuse. 247
V. CONCLUSION
The current military policy of the United States is one of perpetual
war. Such a policy departs from U.S. traditions and the Constitution until
the post-WWII world, where the decision to use military force
transformed from an interbranch dialogue between the Executive and
Legislative branches to an interagency decision in the Executive Branch.
Such a policy is an aberration from previous understandings of Americans
that war and peace were distinctive. Peace rather than war was the
natural state, and this aberration has had disastrous effects, warping U.S.
foreign policy as well as causing ill domestic effects.
In understanding the policy of perpetual war, the real question has
been how the current legal status leads to the current U.S. policy. The
courts cannot rectify the problem, with various bars to litigation proving
that lawsuits are not the solution. Nor does it appear that the solution will
emerge from a fractious or partisan Congress. Similarly, the Executive
Branch will not look a gift horse in the mouth by an abdicating Congress,
whereby the Executive Branch makes using military force an interagency
decision rather than an interbranch decision.
Because the solution will not emerge from the three branches of
government, the answer to the problem of perpetual war is instead a
radical idea: a constitutional amendment. This Note proposes a
reworking of the War Powers within the Constitution to force interbranch
deliberation on the use of military force, providing pathways for either the
Executive Branch or Legislative Branch to compel compliance via lawsuit.
245
See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the problems related to litigating the War Powers and
War Powers Resolution, including multiple bars to litigation meaning that all cases are
dismissed resulting in the War Powers Resolution as dead-letter law).
246
See supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problems of governance from the Legislative
Branch, denoting that Congress has neither served as an effective counterweight nor has
Congress amended the War Powers Resolution); supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problems
of governance from the Executive Branch, denoting that the Executive Branch has continued
its overreach based on Congressional abdication).
247
See supra note 239 (noting the problems of Congress, including that Congress can tacitly
approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department of Defense, which
was noted as a legitimization of Executive actions noted in Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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The proposed amendment also obviates lawsuits like Captain Smith’s;
while the courts dismissed Captain Smith’s lawsuit for lack of standing or
political question, this proposed amendment empowers only Congress or
the President to sue over military force. The proposed amendment is not
sublime perfection, but an attempt to restore the interbranch dialogue that
the United States originally used for military action, providing a more
sober military and foreign policy.
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